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Abstract
We show that banks significantly under-report the risk in their trading book when
they have lower equity capital. Specifically, a decrease in a bank’s equity capital results
in substantially more violations of its self-reported risk levels in the following quarter.
The under-reporting is especially high during the critical periods of high systemic risk
and for banks with larger trading operations. We exploit a discontinuity in the expected
benefit of under-reporting present in Basel regulations to provide further support for a
causal link between capital-saving incentives and under-reporting. Overall, we show
that banks’ self-reported risk measures become least informative precisely when they
matter the most.
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1 Introduction
Accurate and timely measurement of risk is crucial for assessing the soundness of financial
institutions and the stability of the financial system and economy as a whole. The complexity
of a large bank’s business model, however, makes it difficult for regulators and market
participants to observe the bank’s true risks at a reasonable cost. As a result, outsiders
depend on information from the bank itself to judge its riskiness. These self-reported risk
levels, in turn, heavily influence the regulatory treatment of banks such as their capital
requirements and deposit insurance premium. These consequences can potentially distort
the bank’s incentive to truthfully report their risk. Do banks engage in such behavior by
under-reporting their true risk? What are the implications of this behavior on the usefulness
of risk measures for the financial system as a whole, particularly in times when the financial
system is under stress? We empirically address these policy-relevant questions by examining
the accuracy of self-reported risk measures in banks’ trading books.
While accurate risk reporting is important for the entire business of large financial
institutions, we focus on the trading book because it allows us to cleanly tease out the
under-reporting incentives. Specifically, we are able to detect the incidence of under-reporting
by comparing the level of risk reported by the bank ex-ante with the realized losses on the
same portfolio ex-post. Further, trading desks of large banks have significant risks and have
been the subject of many recent policy debates and discussions on risk-management failures
within a bank, making it an economically attractive setting as well.1 According to Basel
rules, banks measure the risk of their trading portfolios with internal Value-at-Risk (VaR)
models. Broadly, VaR is a statistical measure of risk that estimates the dollar amount of
potential losses from adverse market moves. Regulators around the world use these numbers
to determine capital requirements for market risk. Thus banks can have a strong incentive
1See, for example, the enactment of “Volcker Rule,” (under Title VI of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act) which restricts the trading activity of depository institutions. Recent scandals
include “London Whale” Bruno Iksil at J.P. Morgan in 2012 and Kweku Adoboli at UBS in 2011. These
events cost their banks about $6.2 billion and $2.2 billion in trading losses, respectively.
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to under-report their risk when they approach binding capital requirements. Further, the
use of an internal risk model leaves a great deal of discretion with the reporting banks. VaR
modeling assumptions such as the level of asset volatilities and correlation structure between
asset classes can significantly affect the output of their models (BIS, 2013). This discretion
gives banks a significant ability to under-report their trading risks. The combination of ability
and incentive to under-report risk has the potential to compromise the integrity of the risk
management system and risk-based regulations.
To mitigate the under-reporting incentive, regulators use a “backtesting” procedure to
evaluate banks’ self-reported VaR, and impose a penalty on institutions with poor models.
For example, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) examines the number of
times a bank breaches its self-reported VaR – which we refer to as exceptions or violations
– every quarter.2 If a bank has too many exceptions during the trailing four quarters, the
regulators infer that the bank is more likely to have under-reported in the past, and its
capital requirement is increased for the subsequent periods.3 However, there is also some
probability that an instance of under-reporting does not get detected depending on future
asset price movements. In such a scenario, the under-reporting of the bank goes undetected
and penalties are altogether avoided while enjoying a lower current capital requirement. Even
if the bank does experience VaR exceptions, the potentially significant time delay in detection
and punishment may be sufficient to allow the offending bank to raise capital at a time
when market conditions are more favorable. This regulatory structure therefore leads to the
fundamental tradeoff we examine in this paper: a bank can under-report its risk to save
2See Jorion (2006) for a comprehensive treatment of VaR models, and Kupiec (1995) for further details on
backtesting and statistical methods for assessing the accuracy of VaR models.
3As per the recommendations of Basel committee, a bank’s market-risk capital requirement is set at its
99% VaR number over a 10-day horizon multiplied by a capital multiplier k, which is initially set to three.
However, if a bank breaches its self-reported VaR level too often, it faces higher capital requirement in future
periods. The multiplier ranges from 3.0 (four or fewer exceptions) to 4.0 (ten or greater exceptions). The
purpose of this increasing penalty is in “maintaining the appropriate structure of incentives applicable to the
internal models approach” and to “generally support the notion that nine exceptions is a more troubling result
than five exceptions” (BIS, 1996). We later exploit the shape of this institutional feature in our empirical
tests.
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capital today in exchange for the potential for a higher capital charge in the future.4 All else
equal, raising capital is more costly when a bank has a very low capital base – for such banks,
the trade-off is more likely to tilt the bank’s incentive in favor of saving capital today at
the expense of possibly a higher capital charge in future quarters. The underlying economic
trade-off behind our work maps nicely to the literature on crime and punishment such as
Becker (1968) and Kaplow and Shavell (1994), in which offending agents trade off the benefit
of crime against the cost of punishment in the event of detection.
We assemble a novel data set of self-reported trading book VaR and number of VaR
exceptions (i.e., number of times trading losses exceed the reported VaR) for a sample of some
of the largest financial institutions from the U.S., Europe, and Canada from 2002-2013 to
analyze these incentive effects. In addition to our main tests, our paper makes a contribution
to the literature by providing the first systematic descriptive statistics on VaR and its
exceptions. Our main sample consists of 497 bank-quarter observations of VaR and related
exceptions based on 99% confidence level. The 99% VaR model, assuming 63 trading days in
a quarter, should yield 0.63 exceptions per quarter in expectation. Our sample shows 0.54
average exceptions per quarter, which is very close to this statistical benchmark. However,
the average hides significant time-series variation. The average exception per quarter is below
the statistical benchmark during 2002-2006 (0.09 per bank-quarter), increases to almost 2.5
times the statistical benchmark during 2007-2009 (1.52 per bank-quarter), and then again
falls to a lower level during 2010-2013 (0.15 per quarter). Was the rise in VaR exceptions
during the crisis period solely an artifact of large changes in asset prices, or was it also related
to capital-saving incentives? Our empirical tests are designed to tease out these effects.
In our main test, we estimate the effect of a bank’s equity capital at the beginning of the
quarter on the frequency of its exceptions during the following quarter using a regression
4In addition to regulatory forces, the under-reporting incentives can also arise from a desire to understate
risk measures to other market participants. For example, a bank that is concerned about large outflows of
liabilities can resort to the under-reporting of risk to try to avoid such outflows. Again the basic tradeoff
remains the same: benefits from under-reporting risk in the short-run with potential costs in the long-run.
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model with bank and year-quarter fixed effects. We find that one standard deviation decrease
in a bank’s equity capital at the beginning of the quarter results in an increase of 1.17
exceptions in the following quarter, which is more than twice the sample average of 0.54. Put
differently, banks’ future losses exceed their own risk assessment significantly more frequently
in periods immediately following a decline in their equity capital. Our empirical design is
powerful because exceptions occur when the losses exceed the bank’s self-reported level of
VaR, not simply when the level of VaR is high. Regardless of a given bank’s level of riskiness
or equity capital, the expectation of VaR exceptions should be identical: 1 in 100 trading
days. Therefore, we do not suffer from any biases due to the endogenous determination of
equity capital and the level of risk assumed by the bank. Further, the inclusion of bank and
year-quarter fixed effects ensures that our results are not driven by differences in bank-specific
risk-modeling skills or market-wide shocks.
The number of exceptions can also be influenced by the quality of the risk model used by
the reporting bank. If a bank under-reports simply by mistake in a quarter, then it may have
more exceptions during that quarter. However, such mistakes should not be systematically
concentrated in quarters following those with lower equity capital. A remaining identification
concern is as follows: if a bank’s VaR-model quality deteriorates precisely following quarters
when it has low equity capital, then the negative association between equity capital and VaR
exceptions might not reflect under-reporting incentives, but simply a systematic deterioration
in model quality right after a negative shock to equity capital. For example, if some banks
were relatively less prepared for the financial crisis and underappreciated the increase in risk
during this period, then their risk models are likely to fail at a disproportionately higher rate
during 2007-2009. If these banks also experience negative shocks to equity capital during this
same period, then it can potentially result in a negative correlation between equity capital
and future VaR exceptions.
Given that our sample comprises some of the largest and most sophisticated financial
institutions of the world, it is unlikely that these banks’ modeling quality changes precisely
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after a period with lower equity capital. Second, for the alternative explanation to hold, it
must be the case that banks get continually surprised with increase in risk during 2007-2009.
Since banks frequently update their risk models to reflect the changes in volatilities of asset
returns and correlations across asset classes, the alternative explanation is less likely to hold.
However, we directly address this concern by exploiting a regulation-driven discontinuity in
the costs and benefits of under-reporting from the Basel Committee guidelines on market risk.
Following the guidelines, bank regulators classify banks into three categories or zones based
on the number of exceptions experienced by a bank in the past year: Green (0-4 exceptions),
Yellow (5-9), and Red (≥ 10). Banks falling in different categories face different levels of
regulatory scrutiny and capital charge. Banks in the Green zone have strong incentives to
stay within this zone to avoid both the higher fixed compliance costs that must be incurred
by banks in the Yellow zone and higher capital multiplier. In contrast banks in the Yellow
zone have already incurred many of these costs, and thus face a lower marginal cost of
under-reporting. As a result, banks on differing sides of the Green-Yellow threshold face
sharply different under-reporting incentives. At the same time, it is unlikely that the quality
of a bank’s risk model changes sharply at this threshold as well. Under this identifying
assumption, we are able to separate the effect of differences in model quality from capital-
saving incentives by comparing the under-reporting behavior around this threshold. We show
that banks just above the threshold have almost 5-times as many exceptions in the following
quarter compared to banks just below it. Further, the relationship between equity capital
and future exceptions is stronger and more negative for bank-quarter observations that are
just above the Green-Yellow threshold, compared to observations that fall just below.
We conduct a series of tests to exploit the cross-sectional and time-series variation in
under-reporting incentives to gain a better understanding of the economic channels behind
the main findings. First, we show that the effect is stronger when the trading book represents
a relatively larger portion of the bank’s business (i.e., when the economic benefits of under-
reporting are more meaningful). We next show that the relationship between equity capital
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and VaR exceptions becomes even stronger when the bank has poor stock returns in the
prior quarter. Raising external equity capital is more difficult in such situations, and thus
the incentives to under-report risk even stronger.
From a systemic perspective, it is even more important to understand how banks report
their risk when the entire financial sector is under stress. These are the periods when the
shadow cost of capital is likely to be high across all banks. Thus, a bank’s private marginal
benefit from under-reporting is likely to be higher precisely when the social cost of bank failure
is high. Using different measures of systemic stress, we show that the relationship between
equity capital and under-reporting is stronger during these periods. These results show that
the self-reported risk measures become least informative in periods when understanding
financial sector risk is likely to be most important.
In robustness tests, we show that our results remain strong after controlling for a bank’s
exposure to market and mortgage-backed-securities risk, and the asset-class composition of
the bank’s trading book. In addition, we conduct several sub-sample tests and exploit the
dynamics of exceptions by explicitly controlling for lagged exceptions using an Arellano and
Bond (1991) specification to further rule out the “bad model” alternative discussed earlier.
Finally we shed some light on a possible mechanism through which banks could be
under-reporting their risk. Banks have a great deal of discretion in their modeling choices on
a variety of dimensions. Properly used discretion should improve the quality of the reported
levels of risk exposures. On the other hand, if discretion is used to under-estimate risk
exposure, then this should lead to a greater number of future VaR exceptions. We estimate
the relationship between past stock market volatility and the reported level of VaR. Ceteris
paribus, the higher the volatility of a risk factor, the higher should be the level of VaR. We
find that the relationship between past market volatility and reported VaR levels to be weaker
when banks have lower equity capital. This is consistent with the notion that banks use more
discretion when they have low equity capital. Combined with the main results above, this
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suggests that firms may be using their discretion in the choice of volatility parameters to
under-report their risk.
Our work is closely related to the literature on regulatory arbitrage and failure of model-
based regulations (e.g., see Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013), Behn, Haselmann, and Vig
(2014), Plosser and Santos (2014), Boyson, Fahlenbrach, and Stulz (2016)). Behn et al. (2014)
find that banks’ internal model-based risk estimates systematically underestimated the level
of credit risk in banks’ loan portfolios. While they focus on the accuracy of model-based
regulation compared to standardized approach, our focus is on the relationship between equity
capital and risk under-reporting. In addition, we focus on the trading book risk, which allows
us to sharply compare the ex-ante risk assessment with its immediate ex-post realization.
Second, our work is connected to the literature on risk-management practice in banking
(e.g., see Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013) and the informativeness of VaR models such as Jorion
(2002) and Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002). Our study also has implications for ongoing policy
discussions on capital regulations (e.g., see Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, and Pfleiderer (2013),
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2008), and Thakor (2014)).
Our findings show that in addition to determining the optimal level of capital requirements
for banks, the regulators face an important related challenge in terms of eliciting truthful
disclosure of risk. At a broader level, our work is related to the literature on the economics of
self-reporting behavior and probabilistic punishment mechanisms. Kaplow and Shavell (1994)
show that self-reporting followed by a probabilistic audit and punishment for violation can
be an optimal mechanism in several settings. These models, however, do not consider the
differences in the shadow price of capital at the time of reporting compared to the time of
(potential) punishment. Our work shows that in such settings, the probabilistic punishment
mechanism that ignores state prices may have negative systemic consequences. Finally our
work is related to the literature on mis-reporting incentives in financial markets in a broader
setting (see Piskorski, Seru, and Witkin (2015), and Griffin and Maturana (2016)).
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2 Hypothesis Development and Research Design
The theoretical foundation of our research is rooted in two strands of literature: one on
the economics of crime and punishment, and the other on the incentives of privately informed
financial institutions. The first strand of literature emphasizes the interactions between the
benefits of committing crime to the offending party, the negative externality it imposes on
the rest of the society, and then the costs of crime detection and punishment. Becker (1968)
emphasizes the idea that socially desirable enforcement policy need not be to detect all
the crimes all the time. Rather a probabilistic detection strategy with adequately modified
sanctions on the detected offender might be the optimal policy. Kaplow and Shavell (1994)
extend this idea by adding self-reporting behavior in a model of probabilistic enforcement.
The key insight from their work is that in many settings the offender may find it optimal to
truthfully self-report the crime and obtain a certain punishment, instead of hiding the crime
and receiving higher sanctions in case they are caught. The ideas from this literature map
well to the underlying mechanism of VaR reporting: a bank can truthfully report its level of
risk and meet its capital requirement today, or face the probability of higher capital charge
and regulatory sanctions in the future.
Closer to the banking research, papers by Chan, Greenbaum, and Thakor (1992) and
Colliard (2014) provide the theoretical bases for our work. In the first paper, the authors study
the impact of a financial institution’s private information on regulatory policies. While they
focus on deposit insurance policies, their idea is fairly general: uninformed regulators need to
take into consideration the incentives of regulated informed parties in setting policies. Colliard
(2014) studies the trade-offs inherent in regulations linking a bank’s capital requirements
to its risk levels generated by internal models. One of the key features of his model is the
possibility of strategic under-reporting when a bank’s capital requirement depends on risk
levels.
Similar to these theoretical models, in our setting banks are likely to trade-off the marginal
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cost of equity capital at the time of reporting with the expected marginal cost of penalty
from under-reporting. When a bank enters a low-equity-capital state, the trade-off is likely to
tilt its decision in favor of under-reporting to get immediate capital relief. Such a bank may
experience an improvement in its equity capital position in future quarters; the aggregate
market conditions might improve in the meantime making raising external capital relatively
less costly; or the under-reporting might never get detected. All these forces provide incentives
to under-report. Conversely, if managers know that the bank’s equity capital shocks are likely
to be extremely persistent over time or the probability of detection is very high, then the
under-reporting incentives are unlikely to be as strong. In the end, the relationship between
equity capital and under-reporting incentives remains an empirical question that we tackle in
the rest of the paper.
Value-at-Risk is a statistical measure of risk that estimates a dollar amount of potential
loss from adverse market moves over a fixed time-horizon and at a given confidence interval.
Absent any incentive conflict, we would expect to see one exception (i.e., losses exceeding
the reported VaR level) every 100 trading days for the 99% VaR models. Alternatively,
we should observe more frequent exceptions for banks following quarters with lower equity
capital if banks strategically under-report their risk to save capital. Note that a bank may
change its risk-taking behavior in response to changes in its equity capital position, but
these changes should only affect the level of VaR, not the frequency of exceptions.5 This
fundamental distinction highlights a key strength of our empirical setting: we relate capital-
saving incentives to deviations from self-reported VaR numbers, which is independent of the
scale of risk-taking.
To develop the intuition behind our empirical test, consider the VaR of a single unit of a
risky asset i at time t. Denote this portfolio’s reported and actual VaR by Reportedit and
5If a bank enters new business areas in response to changes in equity capital and at the same time it has
poor modeling skills in measuring risk for such an area, then there is a possibility of correlation in equity
capital and exceptions. As we show later in the paper, the relative proportion of business mix across interest
rate, foreign currency, equity, and commodity risk has remained stable over time during our sample period.
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Actualit, respectively. Assume that σpredicted is the volatility parameter used by the bank’s
internal model in computing its reported VaR. Although banks differ in their modeling and
implementation approach, they all require the modeler to take a stand on the volatility of the
assets and covariances between securities and asset classes to estimate the potential loss of
the portfolio.6 Further assume that the realized volatility of the asset is denoted by σrealized.
We can express the reported VaR as a function G of risk (σpredicted) at a confidence interval
(α) with residual (ηit) as follows:
7
Reportedit = G(α, σpredicted)− ηit
ηit = φ(Incentivesit) + uit
The key term in the equation is the residual term ηit. In our model, this captures the extent
of under-reporting and is driven by incentive effects and pure noise (uit). The actual VaR,
if the analyst had a perfect foresight of future volatility, can be expressed as G(α, σrealized).
Our goal is to identify the incentive effects in VaR reporting using the following framework:
Actualit −Reportedit = {G(α, σrealized)−G(α, σpredicted)}+ φ(Incentivesit) + uit (1)
We use the frequency of VaR exceptions for bank i in a given quarter t (Exceptionsi,t+1) as
an empirical proxy for the difference between actual (or realized) and reported risk numbers
(Actualit −Reportedit) in (1). To ensure comparability across observations, we focus on VaR
6Banks typically develop their own internal model for VaR based on one of three approaches: (a) variance-
covariance method, (b) historical simulation, or (c) Monte Carlo simulation. Banks typically use the past
one to three years of data as an estimate of the underlying asset’s historical volatility. For example, Bank
of America state in their 2008 10-K, “Our VaR model uses a historical simulation approach based on three
years of historical data and assumes a 99 percent confidence level. Statistically, this means that the losses
will exceed VaR, on average, one out of 100 trading days, or two to three times each year.”
7For example, G(α, σpredicted) = 2.33 × σpredicted for a normally distributed asset at a 99% confidence
level. For a normally distributed changes in asset value, VaR = N−1(α) × σ, where N−1() is the inverse
normal CDF. -2.33 is the point at which 1% of the mass of the distribution lies below (to the left). The
corresponding number for a 95% confidence level is -1.65. Note, however, that we do not rely on normality
assumptions for developing our empirical model.
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reported at a 99% confidence interval in all of our main specifications.8 The distribution
of {G(α, σrealized)−G(α, σpredicted)} measures the quality of risk model – for a good model,
this difference should be close to zero and uncorrelated with the incentive variable. We refer
to this difference as the “model quality” in the rest of the paper. Thus, our model can be
rewritten as follows:
Exceptionsi,t+1 = ModelQualityit + φ(Incentivesit) + uit (2)
where Exceptionsi,t+1 measures the number of VaR exceptions over the next period.
Since ModelQualityit is not perfectly observable, we confront three primary challenges in
identifying the incentive effects on under-reporting. First, banks may have different modelling
skills. Differences in risk-management skills, organizational structure, risk culture, incentive
structure and the importance of internal risk controls within the firm can all have significant
influence on the level of risk-taking by banks (see Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz (2012);
Ellul and Yerramilli (2013); Kashyap et al. (2008)). If these persistent unobserved modeling
skills correlate with equity capital, then our estimates will be inconsistent. We include bank
fixed-effect in the empirical specification to address this concern. Second, during periods of
large fluctuations in market prices, the realized volatility may be significantly higher than
the predicted volatility used in the VaR model, leading to general failures or an abnormally
high number of exceptions in VaR models across banks during these times. We include
year-quarter fixed effect in the empirical specification to address this concern. Thus, our
baseline model that addresses these two concerns can be expressed as below, where λi and
δt are bank and year-quarter fixed effects, and Xit is a vector of further control variables
including the size and profitability of the bank:
Exceptionsi,t+1 = β(Incentivesit) + λi + δt + ΓXit + it (3)
8In a robustness test, we expand the sample and reconstruct the test to include observations where VaR is
reported at 95% confidence level.
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The third primary identification challenge is related to concerns about potentially time-
varying, bank-specific changes in model quality that correlates with their Incentivesit to
save capital, which we primarily measure using the bank’s equity capital ratio (Equityit).
A potential source for such a time-varying changes in model quality could be relative
unpreparedness of some banks for the financial crisis of 2007-2009. If the unprepared
banks had more frequent and persistent failures of their risk model and if they experienced
concomitant negative shocks that gave them lower equity capital during the same period,
then our results could be an artifact of relative unpreparedness rather than strategic under-
reporting. As mentioned earlier, the tests relate equity capital at the beginning of the quarter
to the number of VaR exceptions during the next quarter. For the alternative explanation to
hold, it must be the case that the VaR model becomes relatively more inaccurate during the
following quarter only when banks have had low equity capital at the beginning of the quarter
and this relationship occured for reasons unrelated to reporting incentives. This explanation
is unlikely to be true because banks are required to update their VaR model regularly to
better capture the changes in underlying volatilities. Nevertheless, we directly address this
concern by exploiting an institutional feature of the market risk capital regulation formulated
by Basel Committee on Bank Supervision (BIS, 1996). For expositional simplicity, we discuss
this research design in detail when we present these results in Section 4.1.
3 Data and Sample
Our study provides the first comprehensive analysis of VaR exceptions and its determinants.
Therefore, in addition to our main exercise that examines the under-reporting incentives, our
paper makes an important contribution to the literature by documenting some key empirical
facts about trading risk in banks and the accuracy of their risk models. We discuss the data
collection procedure and present some key descriptive statistics of the sample below.
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3.1 Data Collection
We start with a list of 50 largest banks of the world and supplement it with the list of
20 largest commercial banks of the U.S. based on asset size as of 2008.9 We narrow this
list down to the subset of 41 banks domiciled in the U.S., Canada, and Europe, and read
their 10-Q, 10-K, and 20-F filings from 2002 to 2013 to obtain information on VaR levels and
VaR exceptions. Institutions that provide sufficient details about the level of VaR during the
quarter, and the number of exceptions over the same period, enter our final sample. Appendix
A provides further details on our sample selection criteria and data collection procedure.
Our “base” sample includes commercial banks that report their VaR at the 99% confidence
level, and these observations are the subject of the bulk of our analysis. Our “expanded”
sample adds three important broker-dealers of the U.S. as well as observations where a
commercial bank reports VaR at 95%. We do not include these observations in our base
sample because it is not generally meaningful to compare the frequency of VaR exceptions
across different confidence intervals. In addition to the consistency in reporting, commercial
banks are also more homogenous in terms of their capital requirements. We make use of the
expanded sample in our robustness tests.10
In total, our base sample has 497 bank-quarter observations over 2002-2013 period covering
16 commercial banks. Commercial banks in our sample have over $14 trillion in assets. This
compares well with the aggregate asset base of about $13-14 trillion for U.S. commercial
banks, and about AC30 trillion for banks covered by the ECB as of 2013. Even more important,
these institutions cover a disproportionately large fraction of trading assets of the economy.
The expanded sample contains 638 bank-quarter observations over the same time period.
9Since the list of very large financial institutions of the world has remained broadly the same over our
sample period, choosing 2008 as the classification year does not pose any serious sample selection concerns
for our study.
10Broker-dealers also face capital requirements for market risks based on similar Basel Committee formula.
Their net capital requirement is regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). SEC’s formula
for computing capital requirement for market risk is identical to the formula used by other banking regulators
for commercial banks (SEC, 2004).
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We also collect data on some measures of systemic stress. Our key measure of systemic
stress is the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) of the banking sector, provided by the
New York University’s Volatility Lab (see Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson
(forthcoming)). We obtain this measure for all systemically important financial institutions of
the world on a quarterly basis, and aggregate them to construct the systemic MES measure.
The MES measure varies considerably over time, providing us with reasonable time-series
variation in the extent of capital shortfall in the economy.
We collect balance sheet data on banks’ equity capital, profitability, and asset base on a
quarterly basis from the bank’s quarterly filings and Bankscope. We also obtain their stock
returns from CRSP and Datastream. Data on interest rate, foreign currency, equity, and
commodity volatility come from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank, CRSP, and Bloomberg.
All data are winsorized at the 1% level to mitigate the effects of any outliers in the regression
analysis. Continuous variables and the number of exceptions are standardized to have zero
mean and unit standard deviation prior to the regression analysis for easier interpretation.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the base sample. The sample banks have an
average asset base of $875 billion. On average, they are profitable during our sample period,
with a mean quarterly net-income-to-assets ratio of 0.16%. On average banks have 6.29%
equity as a percentage of their asset base. This ranges from 4.15% for the 25th percentile
bank to 8.94% for the 75th percentile. Following prior literature, most of our main tests focus
on the log of this ratio, which emphasizes the idea that the strength of incentives increase at
an increasing rate as capital levels get lower. We use the book equity capital ratio instead
of the regulatory capital ratio as the key variable for our tests to avoid measurement error
problems. Regulatory capital ratios, such as the risk-weighted Tier-1 capital ratio, use the
computed risk-weighted assets of the bank in the denominator. The VaR of the trading book
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is an important variable in the computation of the ratio, which then leads to a mechanical
correlation between under-reporting and regulatory capital ratio.
Focusing now on the VaR data, Figure 1 provides the mean, median, 10th and 90th
percentiles of the level of VAR over the sample period. The numbers reported in Table 1 and
in Figure 1 are 99% VaR for a 1-day holding period. For the regulatory capital requirement
calculations, these numbers are scaled up to a 10-day holding period horizon, typically by
multiplying them by a factor of
√
10. It is evident that VaR levels increased considerably
during the financial crisis, consistent with the idea that as the volatility of underlying assets
increase, risk models are updated to reflect this fact. It is also evident that there is a large
variation in the importance of trading risk across banks in our sample, a feature we exploit
later in our tests.
Figure 2 presents the time-series changes in the breakdown of total VaR across risk-
categories, namely interest rate, foreign currency, equities, commodities, and other assets.
Interest rate risk forms the largest proportion of the average bank’s trading book risk, often
representing about 50% of the bank’s total trading risk . However, banks have meaningful
exposure to foreign exchange, equities, and commodities risk as well.
Table 2 provides some key descriptive statistics for each financial institution that enter
our sample. There is a large cross-sectional variation in the level of VaR as well as exceptions
across banks. Table 2 also highlights the substantial within-bank variation of VaR levels
and exceptions. For example, UBS’s one-day VaR ranged from $24 million to $447 million
during our sample period, corresponding to $79 to $1,414 million for 10-day VaR. Their
quarterly exceptions ranged from 0 to 25 over this period. At the same time, we have banks
like Bank of Montreal that have relatively few quarterly exceptions. These statistics highlight
the richness of our data in terms of both within-bank and across-bank variations over time.
Overall, the pooled-sample statistics indicate that the sample comprises very large banks
with a wide variation in equity capital, trading-book risk exposure, and VaR exceptions.
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3.3 Economic significance
How economically meaningful are the market-risk capital charges for trading-book risk?
As indicated earlier, we focus on the trading book of a bank because this setting allows us to
detect under-reporting in a relatively straightforward and clean way. Our result does not
imply that under-reporting in other parts of the business is absent or unimportant. To assess
the economic significance of the capital charge from the trading book, we compute the capital
charge based on reported VaR numbers for our sample banks and compare them to some
sensible measures of the capital position of these banks. It is important to note that the
calculation of regulatory capital charge is based on a 10-day holding period VaR, but for
reporting purposes banks report 1-day holding period VaR. This effectively means that we
need to scale up the one-day VaR (e.g., as listed in Tables 1 and 2) by a factor of
√
10 when
computing the regulatory capital charge.
Based on VaR numbers reported by the sample banks in 2008, average capital charge
for that year ranges from $179 million to $4,649 million, with a mean of $1,667 million.11
These numbers are not insignificant compared to the total capital base of the banks. As a
percentage of their tier-1 capital, the VaR-based capital charge ranges from 0.9% to 13.3%,
with a mean of 4.1%. Another meaningful benchmark for evaluating the economic significance
of capital charge is not simply a bank’s total capital base, but its “marginal” capital base,
such as the relevant addition to (or depletion from) the common equity capital of the bank
during the year. Dividend payout during the year provides one such benchmark since this
amount is directly related to the extent of retained earnings the bank foregoes. As a fraction
of dividend payout, the trading book capital charge is significant for our sample banks –
between 14.3% to 161.4%, with a mean of 51.8%.
11We provide more detailed data and information on the calculations in the Internet Appendix.
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3.3.1 VaR Exceptions Over Time
Table 1 presents summary statistics on VaR exceptions for the sample. On a quarterly
basis, we expect to observe an average of about 0.63 exceptions based on roughly 63 trading
days per quarter for 99% VaR numbers. Across banks and quarters, the average quarterly
exceptions (Exceptions) is 0.54 for the base sample which is in line with the statistical
expectation. Figure 3 presents the aggregate variation in VaR exceptions over time. The
average number of VaR exceptions are well below their statistical expectation during 2002-
2006 at 0.09 per bank-quarter, but starting in 2007 the exceptions increase by a considerable
amount.12 The spike in these exceptions coincide with a period of increased systemic risk
in the economy of 2007-2009, where there are 1.65 (1.52 after winsorization) exceptions per
bank-quarter. From 2010-2013, we once again observe fewer VaR exceptions per bank-quarter.
This figure provides a clear insight: on average, the VaR models failed during periods of high
systemic risk when timely and accurate risk measurement in the financial sector is likely
most important. During these periods, the exceptions are far greater than what reliable
risk-measurement reporting would predict. While this point has been argued by various
market observers, our paper provides first systematic assessment of this issue.
Was the increase VaR exception frequency during this period solely an artifact of large
changes in asset prices, or was it also related to capital-saving incentives? As a prelude to
formal statistical tests designed to answer this question, we provide a univariate analysis of
the relationship between equity capital and VaR exceptions. We classify banks’ observations
into four groups based on the level of equity capital at the beginning of a quarter. We first
subtract the average level of equity capital of the bank during the entire sample from the
quarter’s equity capital value. Thus, we are able to classify banks into different groups of
equity capital based on the deviation from their average levels. Figure 4 plots the average
12Relatively fewer exceptions in the earlier parts of the sample period is suggestive of conservative risk-
reporting on average during these years. Our focus in this paper is on the relationship between equity capital
and failure of VaR models in the other direction, i.e., when losses exceed self-reported numbers. Hence we do
not further explore the possibility of conservative risk-reporting in the earlier period.
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number of exceptions for each group over the next quarter, and the fraction of banks that
have at least one exception over the next quarter. There is a distinct negative association
between the two variables: bank-quarter observations in the lower equity capital bucket as
of the beginning of the quarter have significantly higher number of VaR exceptions during
the quarter as compared to observations in the highest equity capital bucket. The average
number of exceptions is 1.17 for the lowest bucket compared to 0.15 for the highest bucket.
In terms of the likelihood of getting an exception, the lowest equity capital bucket has a
29% chance of having an exception during the next quarter compared to 11% for the highest
bucket.
4 Results
We estimate the regression model linking equity capital to VaR exceptions described in
equation (3) and present the estimation results in Table 3. We start with a specification in
column (1) that does not include any fixed effects. We find a negative coefficient of -0.30
(p-value< 0.01) on the log of equity capital variable.13 In column (2), we include bank
fixed-effects and find a coefficient of -0.85 (p-value< 0.01) on the same variable. Column (3)
only includes year-quarter fixed effects and finds a negative coefficient of -0.25 (p-value< 0.01).
As mentioned earlier, the number of exceptions and all continuous variables are standardized
to mean zero and unit standard deviation for ease of interpretation. Thus, these coefficients
represent the effect of one standard deviation change in equity capital on the number of
standard deviation changes in future exceptions. Comparing the coefficients in columns (1),
(2) and (3), it is clear that the effect of equity capital on future exception is much larger when
we include bank fixed-effects. Said differently, as banks enter a low equity capital quarter
13The log-transform of equity ratio follows the literature and assigns more weight on variation in equity
capital at lower values. This is consistent with our key economic argument that incentives to under-report is
higher when banks have lower levels of equity. We estimate our model with equity-to-asset ratio as well as
other natural concave transformations of the ratio such as the square root and cubic root of equity ratio and
discuss these results later in the paper.
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compared to their average levels, they experience significantly more exceptions during the
quarter again compared to their average exceptions during the sample. Since the bank fixed
effect model controls for the effect of any time-invariant unobserved bank-specific effects,
such as risk culture or modeling skills of the bank, this result is of particular relevance for
our analysis.
Columns (4)-(6) present the results from full specification that includes both bank and
year-quarter fixed effects. The results in column (4) confirm the negative effect of equity
capital on VaR exceptions even after controlling for both of the fixed effects. In terms of
economic magnitude, one standard deviation (s.d.) decrease in equity capital results in
approximately 0.69 s.d., or 1.28, more exceptions in the following quarter. With a sample
average of 0.54 exceptions, this is an economically significant increase to over three times
the average VaR exception frequency. In column (5), we include controls for bank size
and profitability, and explicitly include measures of the volatility of underlying risk factors
during the quarter in the regression model.14 Our main result is virtually unaffected, both
statistically and economically. This full specification yields a point estimate on equity capital
of -0.63 (p-value<0.01), which corresponds to 1.17 more exceptions the following quarter.
Also, the additional control variables explain very little of the variation in exceptions, as the
R2 only increases from 0.43 to 0.46. We cluster the standard errors in our main specifications
at the year-quarter level. In column (6), we compute standard errors clustered at the bank
level and find that the results are statistically significant at the 3% level.15 Overall, Table 3
documents a strong relationship between equity capital on the accuracy of self-reported VaR
measures.
As discussed earlier, capital charge for trading book can be significant for banks heavily
engaged in trading activities. Since we do not directly observe the extent of under-reporting
14The quarterly timing of reporting is not exactly the same for all banks in our sample. For example, some
banks end their quarter in March, while others end in April. Therefore, the volatility measures during the
bank’s reporting quarter is not perfectly collinear with the calendar time year-quarter fixed effects.
15Since we need a large number of clusters to ensure consistent estimates and bank clustering yields only
16 clusters, we focus on the estimates with year-quarter clustering in the rest of the paper.
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by a bank, but only the incidence of exceptions during a quarter, we are unable to directly
compute the economic magnitude of capital savings from under-reporting based on our
regression coefficients. However, we can provide a broad sense of this economic magnitude
based on some simplifying assumptions. Under reasonable assumptions, the estimate from
our base regression model (column 5 of Table 3) translates into a VaR under-reporting of
approximately 20% by a bank that has one standard deviation lower equity capital than a
truthful reporter.16 This translates directly to a saving of one-fifth of market risk regulatory
capital requirements for such a bank.
4.1 Identification Using the Shape of the Penalty Function
4.1.1 Institutional Setting and Empirical Motivation
Regulators classify banks into “Green”, “Yellow”, and “Red” zone if the number of
exceptions in the past one year is between 0-4, 5-9, and 10 or more, respectively. These
zones, in turn, dictate both the level of regulatory scrutiny and capital charges that the
bank faces in subsequent quarters. Banks in the Green zone face no special regulatory
scrutiny of their risk model, as the lack of exceptions indicate a model that is likely to
be more accurate or sufficiently conservative.17 Banks in the Yellow zone automatically
come under additional regulatory scrutiny and face significantly higher compliance costs.
As stated by the BCBS guidelines: “the burden of proof in these situations should not
be on the supervisor to prove that a problem exists, but rather should be on the bank
to prove that their model is fundamentally sound. In such a situation, there are many
different types of additional information that might be relevant to an assessment of the bank’s
model.” As per the guidelines, such banks may be required to provide more granular data on
16See the Internet Appendix for details on this calculation.
17As per the BIS (1996) policy document, “the green zone needs little explanation. Since a model that
truly provides 99% coverage would be quite likely to produce as many as four exceptions in a sample of 250
outcomes, there is little reason for concern raised by backtesting results that fall in this range.”
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trading risk exposure, intraday trading activities, and a number of other additional pieces of
information. Finally, banks with ten or more exceptions fall into the Red zone. Their model
is considered inaccurate by the regulators: in extreme cases the regulators can even suspend
the bank’s internal risk model, and require the bank to use a punitive standardized model
for risk assessment. In addition to the changes in the level of regulatory scrutiny, banks in
different zones face different levels of capital charge as well, which is a function of the bank’s
reported VaR and a regulatory capital charge multiplier (k). Banks in the Green zone face a
capital charge multiplier of k=3.0; those in Yellow zone face a multiplier between 3.0 and 4.0
depending on the number of past exceptions; and banks in the Red zone face a multiplier of
k=4.0. Appendix B reproduces the full Basel capital charge schedule.18
It is clear that there are two prominent abrupt changes in the relationship between past
exceptions and resulting regulatory scrutiny and capital charges: the Green-Yellow threshold
and the Yellow-Red threshold. The quality of banks’ VaR model, however, is unlikely to
be very different within a given neighborhood of trailing exceptions. For example, model
quality of banks with four exceptions in the past year is likely quite similar to those with
three or five exceptions, particularly since the occurrence of an exception is a probabilistic
event. We use this similarity in model quality combined with the stark change in economic
incentives around the threshold to tease out the causal effect of capital-saving incentives on
risk-reporting. For reasons explained later in the section, we focus on the reporting incentive
of banks that are around the Green-Yellow threshold.
Since the zone assignment is based on the back-testing result of past one year, at the
beginning of each quarter we first compute the number of exceptions that a bank had in the
trailing three quarters. Absent any under-reporting incentives, banks expect to incur roughly
one additional exception every quarter by construction due to the 99% VaR confidence interval.
18Specifically, the market risk charge C equals the greater of the previous day’s reported VaR and the
average of the prior 60 days’ VaR multiplied by the regulatory multiplier k: C = max(VaRt−1, k×VaRave60−day).
Table B.1 in the appendix presents mapping from number of exceptions over the last 250 trading days to the
corresponding supervisory zone and regulatory multiplier.
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For example, a bank that has three exceptions in the past 3 quarters will, in expectation,
have an additional exception in the next quarter for annual total of four exceptions. Thus,
banks with three or fewer exceptions in the past 3 quarters are expected to stay within the
Green zone at the end of the quarter with a four-quarter total of four or fewer exceptions.
We refer to these observations – which in expectation will avoid the additional scrutiny that
faces those in the Yellow zone – as the Green (or control) group for the remainder of the
paper. Banks with four up to eight exceptions, on the other hand, will in expectation be
in the Yellow zone in the next quarter even without any under-reporting. We refer to these
observations as the Yellow (or treatment) group. Given the significantly higher costs and
scrutiny incurred by banks in the Yellow zone relative to the Green zone, banks in the Green
zone have incentives to be relatively more conservative in their risk reporting compared to
banks in the Yellow group. However, such incentives disappear for banks in the Yellow group
who expect to face this scrutiny in any case and thus face lower marginal costs of regulatory
scrutiny. The remainder of the observations are in the Red group.
In addition to the changes in regulatory pressure around the threshold, the shape of
the multiplier function provides further support to our identification strategy. There is a
significant change from a flat multiplier charge of 3.0 to a sharp increase in capital charge
as a bank moves from the Green to the Yellow zone, which makes Green zone banks face
a convex penalty function. However, for banks in the Yellow zone, the multiplier increases
broadly at a linear pace until it reaches a level of 4.0, after which it is capped. Therefore, the
shape of penalty function is concave for banks in this region. This switch in the shape from a
convex penalty function to a concave one further strengthens the relative under-reporting
incentive of banks in the Yellow zone.
In summary, banks in the Yellow group are likely to have a stronger under-reporting
incentive to save capital in the current quarter as compared to the Green group.19 Also,
19The combination of Green zone banks’ desire to avoid additional regulatory scrutiny and the convex cost
function may help explain the seemingly excessive conservatism in VaR reporting we see in the early periods.
Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) also find that VaR estimates tended to be conservative relative to the 99%
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the comparability of these two groups is likely to improve as we narrow the window around
the threshold, where our assumption of similarity in unobserved model quality is most
reasonable. Under the identifying assumption that banks in the neighborhood of the Green-
Yellow threshold are likely to have similar model quality, we are able to identify the effect
of the incentive to save capital on under-reporting by simply comparing the differences in
exceptions around this threshold. Further, using a difference-in-differences research design,
we compare the effect of equity capital on under-reporting in the Yellow zone compared
to the corresponding difference in the Green zone. The effect of equity capital on under-
reporting is expected to be higher for banks in the Yellow zone since the net-benefit from
under-reporting increases sharply at the threshold. Our key identifying assumption here is
that any potential correlation between equity capital and unobserved model quality does not
change in a discontinuous manner precisely at the Green-Yellow threshold.
Of the 445 observations in these tests, 392 are in the Green group, 24 are in the Yellow
group, and 29 are in the Red group. Around the Yellow-Red threshold, we not only have
limited observations, but also the underlying changes in incentives are not as clear in that
neighborhood. On one hand, banks face a flat multiplier charge of k = 4.0 for any number of
exceptions beyond ten, providing them with an incentive to be aggressive in risk reporting.
On the other hand, such banks might also have concerns that their permission to use
internal models may be revoked by the regulator. In such a situation, they face the risk of a
much higher capital charge based on the standardized modeling approach of the regulator.
Considering these factors, we do not exploit this threshold in our empirical tests.
4.1.2 Results
In our first test, we compute the average exceptions in the next quarter for observations
currently in the neighborhood of the Green-Yellow threshold. Figure 5 presents these averages
for each trailing-exceptions bin from 0 to 8. Banks in the Yellow group have significantly
benchmark for six large U.S. banks during 1998-2000.
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higher exceptions than the banks in the Green group. In fact, each trailing-exception bin
in the Yellow group has higher exception than any bin in the Green group. Overall, banks
in the Green group have an average exceptions of 0.28 in the next quarter compared to
the average exceptions of 2.38 for banks in the Yellow group. The average difference of
2.10 across the two groups is statistically significant (p-value<0.01). Narrowing the range
of examination to [2-7] yields a similar statistically significant difference of 1.98 (2.48 for
Yellow observations versus 0.50 for Green). Table B.2 in the appendix presents this statistic
along with other bank characteristics which shows the comparability of the two groups on
observable dimensions. This finding is consistent with our key assertion in the paper: when
the under-reporting incentive increases discontinuously around the Green-Yellow threshold, we
observe significantly higher VaR exceptions the following quarter. Note that our identification
strategy remains valid even if there is some smooth, continuous change in the model quality
around the threshold, as long as such a change is not discontinuous at the same point.
As is evident from Figure 5, there is some heterogeneity in the number of exceptions across
different buckets in the “Yellow” zone. Most notably, there are relatively fewer exceptions
in the bucket with 5 trailing exceptions. There are two key points worth emphasizing here.
First, even with fewer exception in this bucket, it has higher number of exceptions than
any bucket in the “Green” zone. Second, it is important to note that the outcome variable
that we represent in this graph is not the extent of under-reporting itself, but the number of
exceptions which is an increasing, but probabilistic function of the extent of under-reporting.
Hence we expect to see some variance in the realized exceptions on a bucket-by-bucket basis in
small samples. Our tests presented below account for such noises in estimating the statistical
significance of our results.
We extend the analysis further in a regression framework by including indicator variables
Yellow and Red to our base specification (3). Since we require data on trailing three quarters
for this analysis, we lose a few observations for this regression. Table 4 presents the results.
Column (1) presents the base case analysis relating equity capital to future VaR exceptions
24
for this sample. The estimated coefficient of -0.68 on log(Eq/A) is similar to our full sample
result. Column (2) shows a negative and significant coefficient of -0.49 (p-value=0.02) on
log(Eq/A) and 0.62 (p-value=0.01) for the Yellow group. Thus a one s.d. decrease in equity
capital and falling on the right side of the Green-Yellow threshold have economically similar
incentive effects.
We now present the results of the difference-in-differences specification that compares the
effect of equity capital on under-reporting in the Yellow group compared to the corresponding
difference in the Green group. Results are provided in column (3). We find a negative and
significant coefficient on the interaction term log(Eq/A)× Yellow of -0.81 (p-value= 0.06):
banks with lower equity capital in the Yellow group have significantly more future exceptions.
Given the econometric benefits of this specification, this result allows us to get closer to a
causal interpretation of the effect of equity capital on risk under-reporting. The model also
includes the indicator variable for Red zone and its interaction with log(Eq/A). The effect of
equity capital on future exceptions is higher for banks in the Red zone as compared to the
similar effects for banks in the Green group, however this effect is not statistically significant.
Our specifications so far include all observations for which we have data on trailing
exceptions. In columns (4)-(6), we progressively tighten our window of investigation, limiting
our sample to narrower bands around the Green-Yellow threshold. Column (4) limits
observations to banks that have trailing exceptions in [0,8], column (5) to [1,8], and column
(6) to [2,7]. There is a standard trade-off in terms of bias and efficiency as we narrow the band:
the unobserved characteristics such as model quality of banks in the treatment and control
groups are likely to be more similar as we narrow the band, but the fewer observations results
in a loss of statistical precision. Despite the loss in efficiency, we find stronger results as we
narrow the band. The size of the coefficient estimate on the interaction Yellow× log(Eq/A)
increases from about -0.81 to -1.56 as we narrow estimation window. Overall, these results
provide strong support for the main hypothesis that capital-saving incentives drive banks’
under-reporting behavior.
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4.2 Cross-Sectional Variation in the Benefits of Under-Reporting
In the next set of tests, we focus attention on the effect of equity capital on under-reporting
when banks are likely to obtain larger net benefits from doing so. We exploit variation along
two important dimensions: (a) when trading represents a larger fraction of the bank’s business,
and (b) when the firm has recently experienced low stock returns.
For the first test, we compute the ratio of self-reported VaR to equity capital as of 2006Q1
(called VE 2006i) as a proxy for the importance of trading business for the bank. We compute
and freeze this measure for each bank based on exposure at the beginning of 2006 to ensure
that our measure is not affected by post-crisis changes in risk-taking behavior or equity
capital. Using this variable, we estimate our model with data from 2006-2013 period to
examine whether the effect of under-reporting during and in the aftermath of the crisis is
larger for banks with larger trading business just before the crisis. These are the banks that
are likely to have the most sophistication in their trading activities. The key idea behind this
test is that under-reporting gives these banks significantly more capital relief as compared to
banks with smaller trading operations. Table 5 presents the estimation results of a model
that includes the interaction term VE 2006i×Equityit as an additional variable in the model.
Column (1) confirms our base result on this smaller subsample. Column (2) shows that
our main effects are concentrated within banks with larger trading exposure: the coefficient on
VE 2006× log(Eq/A) is negative and statistically significant. In an alternative specification,
we use an indicator variable High(VE 2006)i that equals one for banks that have above-
median trading exposure (VE 2006), and zero otherwise. Column (3) shows that the effect
of equity capital on exceptions for high-trading-exposure banks (-1.63 with p-value<0.01) is
more than twice as large as the base case. Overall, these results are consistent with the idea
that the effect of equity capital on under-reporting is higher when banks have more to gain
in economic terms.
Next, we consider the effect of a bank’s recent stock market return on subsequent exception
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frequency. The incentive to save equity capital by under-reporting is likely to be even higher
after a large decline in stock prices (i.e., market equity). In these quarters, banks are likely to
have relatively higher reluctance and reduced ability to raise external equity capital. Based
on this idea, we include the bank’s equity capital, prior quarter’s stock return, and the
interaction of these terms in the regression model. Table 6 presents the results, with the
baseline full specification reproduced in column (1). For easier economic interpretation, we
divide all observations into two groups based on their prior quarter’s stock returns. LowRet
equals one for firms whose stock price has declined by at least 5% (approximately 30% of
observations). Without the interaction effect, column (3) shows that banks with lower equity
capital as well as banks with poor stock returns have more exceptions, though the estimate on
LowRet is statistically insignificant with p-value of 0.23. This result also alleviates concerns
that our main finding relating equity capital to exception is simply driven by banks that were
surprised by changes in market conditions during the financial crisis since such banks are
likely to experience lower returns as well.
Column (4) includes the interaction effect of equity capital and stock returns, and reveals
that when banks have lower equity capital and lower stock returns, they have significantly
higher future exceptions: we find a coefficient estimate of -0.40 (p-value=0.02) on log(Eq/A),
and -0.37 (p-value=0.03) on the interaction term. Thus, the effect of equity capital remains
strong for both groups of banks, but it is almost twice as large for banks in the lower return
group. We interpret these findings as supportive of the idea that the under-reporting is higher
when the shadow cost of raising external equity is higher.
4.3 Time Series Variation in the Benefits of Under-Reporting:
Systemic Stress
Our results so far shed light on an individual bank’s incentive in isolation. The informa-
tiveness of a bank’s risk measures is important to understand because its failure can have
27
severe negative consequences for the real economy (e.g., see Khwaja and Mian (2008), Chava
and Purnanandam (2011), Schnabl (2012)). These costs are likely to be greater when the
entire banking system is under stress. During these periods, the stability of the entire system
depends crucially on a proper assessment of the banks’ risk exposure. The risk measures
form a key basis for policy responses such as requiring banks to raise additional capital.
These are also times when the supply of capital to banks is likely to be most scarce and thus
costly to raise. As a result, the incentive to under-report and save on capital is likely to
be higher across all banks during these periods. With this in mind, we conduct our next
test to investigate whether the cross-sectional variation in banks’ under-reporting behavior
documented in the main tests are stronger during periods of financial sector stress.
We construct proxies for system wide stress (System Stress) and include the interaction
term Equityit×System Stresst as an additional variable in our base regression model. We use
two primary measures of System Stresst: (a) an indicator variable for the quarter immediately
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers (2008q4) and (b) the total marginal expected shortfall
(MES) for the banking sector. Table 7 presents the results. Column (2) shows that the
effect of equity capital on VaR exceptions increases more than three-fold for the Lehman
failure quarter above the base effect. While a standard deviation decrease in equity capital is
associated with more than one additional future exception outside of this period, the total
effect is 4.35 more exceptions during 2008q4.20 Note that we are estimating the marginal
effect of equity capital on VaR exceptions within this quarter. Thus, any unconditional
increase in volatilities of the underlying risk factors during the quarter is absorbed in the
year-quarter fixed effect.
While the Lehman Brothers failure provides a clearly identifiable period of stress in the
market, a limitation of this measure is that it is based on just one quarter. To exploit
time-varying changes in the level of systemic risks, we obtain the MES for the banking sector
20This is computed as the sum of the coefficients on Equityit and the interaction term Equityit ×
System Stresst times the standard deviation of exceptions: (0.53+1.81)*1.86=4.35.
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as a whole and divide all quarters into four groups based on this measure. Using the quarters
that fall in top quartile of the MES measure as systemically stressful quarters (HiMES ), we
re-estimate our model and present results in Columns (3) and (4).21 The effect of equity
capital on VaR exceptions is primarily concentrated in these quarters. In sum, these results
show that the reported risk measures are least informative when accurate risk measurement
is likely most important for regulators and policy-makers.
4.4 Bank Discretion and the Level of Reported Value-at-Risk
Banks have a great deal of discretion in constructing and implementing their VaR model.
The choice of overall modeling technique (e.g., historical simulation versus Monte Carlo
simulation), the length and weighting scheme of the data period for model calibration, risk
factor volatilities, and correlations are just a few assumptions that can have substantial effects
on banks’ estimate of their risk for reporting purposes (BIS, 2013). Without the knowledge
of precise modeling assumptions and inputs used in the model, we are limited in our ability
to pin down the channels through which banks under-report their risk. However, we provide
some suggestive evidence in this section to shed light on this issue.
Two crucial inputs for a bank’s VaR estimate are the level of exposure to a risk factor
undertaken by the bank and assumptions about the risk factor’s volatility, where the assump-
tion on volatility is typically based on a trailing historical data period. Consider two banks:
one bank uses discretion in making assumptions about volatility parameters versus another
that follows a fixed policy based on past realized volatility. All else equal, the discretionary
bank’s reported level of VaR should be less sensitive than the rule-based bank’s VaR to
publicly observed realized volatility measures. Ex ante, the use of discretion can cause the
models to be more or less accurate in capturing risk. However, if the discretionary bank is
21In robustness tests presented in the Internet Appendix, we use a continuous measure of MES, and also
examine three additional financial stress indexes which are constructed by the Federal Reserve Banks of
Cleveland, Kansas City, and St. Louis, respectively, and find similar results.
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using its discretion to systematically lower their model’s estimate relative to the true risk
in the trading book, then their VaR exceptions should be higher than the rule-based bank
ex post. Based on these ideas, we estimate the sensitivity of reported VaR level to past
macro-economic volatility measures across high- and low-capital banks using the following
model.
log(VaRi,t) = φ(Equityit) + θ(log[Volt]) + ρ(Equityit × log[Volt]) + λi + ΓXit + it (4)
The dependent variable is the log of the reported level of VaR at the beginning of quarter
t, and Volt is the market volatility over the past year as measured by S&P 500 volatility. We
expect to find a positive relationship between past volatility and VaR (θˆ > 0). However, if
banks use more discretion in their VaR computation when they have low equity capital, we
expect the sensitivity of VaR to volatility to be weaker for such banks. In such a case, ρˆ
should be positive and significant.
We estimate the regression model (4) and report the results in Table 8. As shown in
column (1), the past year’s market volatility significantly affects the reported VaR numbers.
However, the full specification in column (3) shows that this relationship is significantly
different across banks with varying degree of equity capital. The coefficient of interest (ρˆ) is
positive and significant at the level of p-value= 0.08. This suggests that when banks have
relatively lower equity capital, the sensitivity of reported VaR to past market volatility is
significantly lower. We repeat the test using the past 2-year S&P 500 volatility in column (6)
and find similar and slightly stronger results. These findings, along with our earlier results
that such banks have higher exceptions in future quarters, lend support to the hypothesis
that banks are under-reporting their VaR by relying on their discretion in choosing volatility
measures.
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4.5 Alternative Explanations & Robustness Tests
4.5.1 Stale Model
We now provide some additional robustness tests to minimize the concern that our results
are driven simply by poor model quality.
Omitting Transition Periods
VaR models are estimated on a daily basis at large banks. They calibrate their model to
historical data and therefore use inputs on volatilities and correlations across asset classes
based on frequently updated historical data. VaR models based on historical data are more
likely to be inaccurate when the economy transitions from a relatively stable state to a
stressful one. However, as banks learn about the risks and correlations over time, they update
their models according to the new levels of risk.22 Hence, the initial inaccuracy of the model
after a shock should have a short half-life.
In our sample, there is a large increase in the volatilities of the underlying risk measures
in 2007 as compared to historical averages. To mitigate the effect from the possible initial
inaccuracy caused by the crisis in 2007, we exclude the entire year of 2007 from our sample
and re-estimate the base model. If some banks simply have poor-quality models, this gives
them time to correct those models. After reproducing the baseline results in column (1) for
reference, we report the result from this test in column (2) of Table 9. Our results remain
similar showing that our findings are not completely driven by periods following extreme
shocks in the market conditions.
Lagged Exceptions as a Proxy for a Poor-Quality, Stale Model
If some firms are just better than the others in modeling their risk, then the inclusion of
22BIS standards require that banks update their model at a minimum of once per quarter (BIS, 2005). For
example, in their 10-K form, Bank of America state, “As such, from time to time, we update the assumptions
and historical data underlying our VaR model. During the first quarter of 2008, we increased the frequency
with which we updated the historical data to a weekly basis. Previously, this was updated on a quarterly
basis.”
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firm fixed effects in our base model separates out such differences. However, if the quality
of risk models deteriorates precisely when a bank enters a low-capital quarter and the poor
quality of the bank’s model is persistent (i.e., not updated), then our inference can be
problematic. While such a time-varying difference in modeling skill seems unlikely, we also
exploit the dynamics of the panel data to further alleviate this concern. In our next test, we
include the lagged exceptions as a proxy for the time-varying model quality of the bank. The
key idea is that if a bank experiences a number of exception during a quarter, that could
indicate that it has a relatively more inaccurate model for that quarter.
We estimate our model using the GMM approach suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991)
since we have lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable in the model with bank
fixed effects. We estimate the model with both first and second lag of quarterly exceptions
as instruments for lagged differences and present the results in columns (3) and (4) of Table
9. While the point estimates on lagged exceptions is indeed positive and significant, the
coefficient of interest on equity ratio remains negative and both economically and statistically
significant for these specifications.
4.5.2 Other Robustness Tests
Table 10 presents results from a battery of additional robustness tests. As discussed earlier,
one of the reasons we focus on the book equity-to-assets ratio in our empirical tests is that
the reported VaR directly affects the computation of regulatory Tier 1 capital requirements.
Nevertheless, Column (1) highlights that our results are robust to using Tier 1 capital as our
measure of equity capital.
Banks have differing sensitivities to various risk factors depending on their business
model. To ensure that our results are not driven by these differences, in a robustness test
we control for differences in sensitivities to two major risk factors during our sample period,
namely the exposure to the aggregate stock markets and mortgage-backed securities. We first
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compute the sensitivity of each bank’s stock returns to equity market returns (proxied by
CRSP value-weighted index) and mortgage-backed securities returns (proxied by PIMCO’s
mortgage-backed securities index). Next we include the estimated sensitivity as control
variables in the regression model. Column (2) shows that these two betas, called Market
Beta and MBS Beta, do not explain our results.
Could our results be driven by differences in the type of risk exposure (e.g., interest rate
versus foreign currency) of the bank’s trading book? In column (3), we directly control
for bank’s VaR composition by including the fraction of total VaR from exposure to each
asset class, and our results remain virtually unaffected. Column (4) shows that our results
remain similar after dropping observations from 2008q4, the quarter when Lehman Brothers
collapsed and the most volatile quarter in our sample.
In the base analyses, we use fixed-effect linear regression models in the base case analyses
since this specification allows us to consistently and efficiently estimate the coefficients of
interest. Considering that the number of exceptions is a count variable, we re-estimate
our main regressions using a poisson count data model. This modeling approach explicitly
recognizes the fact that VaR exceptions only take non-negative integer values. However,
the use of fixed effects in a nonlinear model suffers from the incidental parameter problem,
which can result in inconsistent estimates. With these caveats in mind, column (5) presents
the results from a poisson model regression estimation and shows that our main results do
not change under the count model specifications. We find similar results using a negative
binomial regression.
In the tests so far, we report our results based on 99% VaR measures of commercial
banks. As mentioned earlier, this allows us to have sensible comparison across all observations.
As a robustness exercise, we now repeat our main results by including observations where
VaR exceptions are reported for the 95% level. This allows us to expand our sample to
638 observations. We first estimate a regression with the dependent variable as a dummy
33
variable equal to one if there are any exceptions, and zero otherwise. We also control for
whether the reporting is at the 99% or 95% level (Conf95 ), as there is a level difference in
exception likelihood between those two groups. In column (6), we find that one s.d. lower
equity capital is associated with 34 percentage points (p-value<0.01) higher probability of
experiencing an exception. Alternatively, we use a measure called Excess as the dependent
variable, which compares the actual exceptions to the statistical benchmark based on the
reporting confidence level of VaR. If the exceptions exceed the statistical benchmark, Excess
is set to one and is zero otherwise. Column (7) presents the estimation results, and confirms
the earlier findings.
4.5.3 Unreported Results
We now briefly describe the key findings of a number of additional robustness checks
that are documented in detail in the Internet Appendix of the paper. We first show that
our results are robust to using alternative parameterizations of the equity capital ratio (e.g.,
a quadratic specification, the square root of the ratio, and the cube root of the ratio). We
show that our results are robust to the inclusion of a proxy for the bank’s risk-management
expertise, based on the measure developed by Ellul and Yerramilli (2013). We also conduct a
number of placebo tests for our analysis based on Green-Yellow threshold. Our base analysis
is based on a threshold of four trailing exceptions over the prior three quarters. In placebo
tests, we artificially move the threshold to other points on the “trailing-exceptions” axis, and
do not find any meaningful results at artificial thresholds. We also estimate a bank-by-bank
model to understand whether our results come from just a handful of banks, or do they cover
a broad spectrum of banks. We find that 70% of the banks in the sample have negative
coefficients in regressions linking equity capital to VaR exceptions, showing that our results
come from a broad range of banks with a variety of characteristics.
It is clear that much of our effects come from the financial crisis period. As a robustness
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exercise, we exclude the entire crisis period, starting from 2007Q3 and ending in 2009Q4,
from our sample, and re-estimate our model only with the non-crisis data. We find a negative
and significant coefficient on equity capital when we estimate the model without the inclusion
of bank or year-quarter fixed effects. The coefficient remains negative but indistinguishable
from zero when we include the fixed effects. These results show that our main findings come
from the crisis period, however the broad pattern remains qualitatively similar outside of this
period.
5 Discussion & Conclusions
We show that banks are more likely to under-report their market risks when they have
stronger incentives to save equity capital. Specifically, banks under-report their risk when
they have lower equity capital, and during periods of high systemic stress. Regulators and
investors rely on banks’ self-reported risk measures for a number of regulatory and investment
decisions. The accuracy of these numbers assume special importance particularly when banks
have lower levels of equity capital, and thus they are closer to failure. Moreover, accurate
risk reporting is extremely valuable during periods of systemic stress because the success of
a number of policy responses depends crucially on a clear understanding of the level and
nature of the risk undertaken by poorly capitalized financial institutions in the economy. Our
findings highlight some important shortcomings of the current regulation. We show that the
integrity of self-reported measures becomes most questionable precisely when accurate risk
measurement in the financial system is most important.
Our results raise an immediate question: what should be the alternative mechanism
of risk-reporting that mitigates the under-reporting incentives? The intuition from our
work suggests several possible paths for future policy design. It is clear that under the
current mechanism, the penalty function (i.e., k multiplier) ignores the state of the world
in which under-reporting occurs. It may be useful to tie down the penalty function to the
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shadow price of capital for the bank, for example, by differentiating the under-reporting
penalty based on the bank’s own capital position as well as the capital shortfall of the entire
banking sector. Similarly, we conjecture that the policy design can be improved by using
relative benchmarking of VaR models. At the very core of this regulation, the regulators
need to separate strategic under-reporting from bad model or unlucky ex-post outcomes.
Average levels of exceptions across all banks during a quarter can be used as a starting
point for gauging the extent of bad-model problems experienced by all banks in the economy.
Banks that experience significantly more deviations from the averages are more likely to
be under-reporting their true risks. Recent theoretical work by Colliard (2014) considers
several policy proposals, such as penalizing banks with large losses or rewarding banks for
truthful reporting, to alleviate the concerns about strategic under-reporting. Earlier work by
Chan et al. (1992), who highlight the difficulty in estimating risk-sensitive deposit insurance
premium for depository institutions that are privately informed about their true risk, also
provides theoretical insights into policy alternatives designed to elicit truthful reporting from
privately informed banks. Our empirical findings emphasize the need for more theoretical
work along these lines to understand the costs and benefits of different mechanisms aimed at
extracting accurate information from regulated banks.
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Figure 1: Value-at-Risk Levels Over Time
This figure presents the mean, median, 10th percentile, and 90th percentile of the level of Value-at-
Risk over the sample period based on one-day VaR at the 99% level.
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Figure 2: The Composition of Trading-Book Risk
This figure presents the mean composition of trading-book risk across various risk categories over
the sample period based on one-day Value-at-Risk at the 99% level. The total trading-book VaR is
composed of interest rate risk (IR), foreign exchange risk (FX), equities risk (EQ), commodities risk
(COM), and other risk (OTH).
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Figure 3: Average Value-at-Risk Exceptions
This figure presents the average frequency of Value-at-Risk (VaR) exceptions for banks each quarter
during the 2002-2013 sample period. The dashed line at 0.63 represents the expected exception
frequency based on 99% VaR confidence interval and approximately 63 trading days per quarter.
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Figure 4: Equity Capital and Future Exceptions
This figure presents the average number of Value-at-Risk exceptions (left axis) and the portion of
observations with at least one exception (right axis) for different levels of equity capital. We divide
the observations within each bank into four groups based on the bank’s equity capital position at
the beginning of the quarter from lowest equity capitalization to highest.
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Figure 5: Distribution of Value-at-Risk Exceptions
This figure presents the average number of Var exceptions reported by a bank in quarter t across
different groups of “trailing exceptions.” “Trailing exceptions” measures the total number of
VaR exceptions reported by the bank in trailing three quarters (Exceptionst−1 + Exceptionst−2 +
Exceptionst−3).
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Table 1: Base Sample Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for our sample. These sample statistics are for the base sample of
commercial banks reporting 99% Value-at-Risk during 2002-2013. Table 2 provides details of the specific
banks in the sample. Exceptions is the number of times the bank had losses that exceeded their self-reported
Value-at-Risk during the next quarter, Value-at-Risk is the reported level of future loss that should not be
exceeded at the 99% confidence level, and VaR-[Trading Desk] variables are the reported value-at-risk for the
various trading desks (interest rate, foreign exchange, equities, and commodities) with Diversification Benefit
representing the claimed reduction in VaR due to less than perfect correlation across trading desks.
Mean SD Min P25 Median P75 Max N
Bank Characteristics:
Total Assets (Bn) 875.24 741.04 73.14 302.21 571.54 1393.60 3643.58 497
NI-to-Assets (%,Q) 0.16 0.15 -0.52 0.09 0.19 0.24 0.49 497
BookEq/A (%) 6.29 3.01 1.66 4.15 5.24 8.94 13.84 497
log(Eq/A) -2.88 0.49 -4.10 -3.18 -2.95 -2.41 -1.98 497
Value-at-Risk ($MM):
Exceptions [Raw Data] 0.58 2.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.00 497
Exceptions [Winsorized 99%] 0.54 1.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.00 497
Total Value-at-Risk 56.74 81.82 4.00 9.60 21.50 69.00 447.00 491
VaR-Interest Rate 41.65 69.07 0.00 4.76 12.83 51.01 430.58 491
VaR-Foreign Exchange 8.33 11.94 0.00 0.90 2.43 12.00 62.82 491
VaR-Equities 18.74 29.48 0.00 3.16 6.38 23.90 204.60 491
VaR-Commodities 6.68 10.31 0.00 0.32 1.46 8.43 52.31 491
VaR-Other 15.76 46.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.12 322.88 491
VaR-Diversification Benefit 37.53 51.33 0.00 5.01 10.76 54.82 241.67 491
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Table 2: Sample Composition and Value-at-Risk Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for our sample. Panel A presents statistics for the “Base Sample,”
which comprises commercial banks reporting 99% Confidence Interval Value-at-Risk (VaR) during 2002-2013.
Panel B presents statistics for observations that are added to form the “Expanded Sample,” which also
includes commercial bank observations reporting 95% VaR and observations from broker/dealers. Exceptions
is the number of times the bank had losses that exceeded their self-reported Value-at-Risk during the next
quarter, Value-at-Risk is the reported level of future loss that should not be exceeded at the defined confidence
level (99% or 95%). Where there are differences, we report both the winsorized figures and the raw figures [in
brackets] for exceptions data. N represents the number of quarters a bank in present in our sample.
Panel A: Base Sample
Exceptions (99% CI) Value-at-Risk
Bank Mean Min Max Mean Min Max N
Bank of America Corporation 0.42 0.00 10.00 92.08 32.50 275.80 48
Bank of Montreal 0.68 0.00 5.00 23.32 7.60 46.00 37
Bank of New York Mellon 0.06 0.00 2.00 7.74 4.00 13.40 48
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 0.13 0.00 3.00 8.44 4.00 18.70 48
Citi Group 0.15 0.00 1.00 152.67 105.00 224.00 13
Credit Suisse Group 1.39 0.00 11.00 119.18 44.00 243.00 28
Deutsche Bank 1.38 0.00 13 [16] 88.63 55.10 142.90 32
ING Group 0.00 0.00 0.00 17.85 7.30 39.00 17
JPMorgan Chase 0.38 0.00 5.00 113.34 53.70 289.00 32
PNC Financial Service Group 0.44 0.00 5.00 7.39 4.70 11.70 27
Royal Bank of Canada 0.66 0.00 4.00 34.31 18.00 60.00 32
Scotia Bank 0.09 0.00 1.00 13.40 6.80 29.30 46
SunTrust Bank 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.57 4.00 28.00 17
TD Bank 0.12 0.00 2.00 21.12 8.20 60.00 41
UBS 2.39 0.00 13 [25] 247.18 24.00 447.00 28
UniCredit Group 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.43 28.80 39.80 3
Panel B: Additional Observations for Expanded Sample
99% CI 95% CI
Exceptions Exceptions
Bank Mean Max VaR N Mean Max VaR N
Goldman Sachs – – – 0 0.73 6.00 115.48 44
JPMorgan Chase – – – 0 0.50 3.00 66.63 16
Lehman Brothers 4.50 9.00 126.50 2 0.33 3.00 45.09 15
Morgan Stanley 0.00 0.00 66.50 18 1.17 9 [13] 97.57 30
PNC – – – 0 0.25 1.00 3.53 12
UBS – – – 0 0.00 0.00 15.75 4
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Table 3: Equity Ratio and Future Value-at-Risk Exceptions
This table presents OLS estimates from a regression of the number of VaR exceptions in the next quarter on
banks’ equity capital ratio log(Eq/A) and a vector of control variables. Exceptions is the number of times the
bank had losses that exceeded their self-reported Value-at-Risk during the next quarter, log(Eq/A) is the log
of the book equity-to-assets ratio, log(Assets) is the log of total assets, NI-to-Assets is the ratio of quarterly
net income-to-assets, and Vol variables are the volatilities of commodity, S&P 500, Foreign Exchange, and
Interest Rate indices. All continuous variables and Exceptions are standardized (denoted by “(z)”) to have a
mean of zero and unit variance.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(z)log(Eq/A) -0.30∗∗∗ -0.85∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗ -0.69∗∗∗ -0.63∗∗∗ -0.63∗∗
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.03)
(z)log(Total Assets) 0.54 0.54∗∗
(0.12) (0.05)
(z)NI-to-Assets -0.03 -0.03
(0.65) (0.70)
(z)Vol-Commodities 0.05 0.05
(0.57) (0.16)
(z)Vol-S&P 500 0.35∗∗ 0.35∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
(z)Vol-Foreign Exchange 0.07 0.07
(0.40) (0.18)
(z)Vol-Interest Rate 0.03 0.03
(0.88) (0.71)
Bank FE No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 497 497 497 497 497 497
R2 0.09 0.20 0.35 0.43 0.46 0.46
Clustered by Y-Q Y-Q Y-Q Y-Q Y-Q Bank
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4: The Shape of Penalties, Equity Ratio, and Future Violations
This table presents OLS estimates from a regression of the number of VaR exceptions in the next quarter on
banks’ equity capital ratio log(Eq/A) and a vector of control variables. Exceptions is the number of times
the bank had losses that exceeded their self-reported Value-at-Risk during the next quarter, Yellow is an
indicator variable equal to 1 when the bank has four to nine VaR exceptions in the past 3 quarters, Red is an
indicator variable equal to 1 when the bank has ten or more VaR exceptions in the past 3 quarters, log(Eq/A)
is the log of the book equity-to-assets ratio, log(Assets) is the log of total assets, NI-to-Assets is the ratio
of quarterly net income-to-assets, and Vol variables are the volatilities of commodity, S&P 500, Foreign
Exchange, and Interest Rate indices. All continuous variables and Exceptions are standardized (denoted by
“(z)”) to have a mean of zero and unit variance. Standard errors are clustered by year-quarter.
(z)Exceptions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Full Full [0-8] [1-8] [2-7]
(z)log(Eq/A) -0.68∗∗∗ -0.49∗∗ -0.34∗ -0.23 -0.09 -1.94∗
(<0.01) (0.02) (0.08) (0.15) (0.80) (0.07)
Yellow 0.62∗∗ 0.51∗ 0.62∗∗ 0.67∗∗ 1.06
(0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.36)
(z)log(Eq/A) * Yellow -0.81∗ -0.79∗ -1.48∗∗∗ -1.56∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (<0.01) (0.04)
Red 0.96 0.61
(0.21) (0.31)
(z)log(Eq/A) * Red -0.40
(0.20)
(z)log(Total Assets) 0.80∗ 0.73 0.52 0.38 -0.62 -2.04
(0.08) (0.12) (0.32) (0.48) (0.39) (0.13)
(z)NI-to-Assets -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.13 -0.02
(1.00) (0.95) (0.96) (0.38) (0.32) (0.95)
(z)Vol-Commodities 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.16 0.18
(0.72) (0.88) (0.71) (0.20) (0.21) (0.51)
(z)Vol-S&P 500 0.37∗∗ 0.38∗∗ 0.37∗∗ 0.37∗∗ 0.41∗ 0.61∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01)
(z)Vol-Foreign Exchange 0.06 0.04 0.05 -0.03 0.07 0.14
(0.51) (0.58) (0.52) (0.43) (0.63) (0.59)
(z)Vol-Interest Rate 0.03 0.13 0.10 0.15 0.08 -0.11
(0.85) (0.45) (0.58) (0.37) (0.62) (0.71)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 445 445 445 416 133 67
R2 0.49 0.51 0.54 0.56 0.76 0.85
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
48
Table 5: Future Exceptions when VaR is a larger portion of Equity Capital
This table presents OLS estimates from a regression of the number of VaR exceptions in the next quarter on
banks’ equity capital ratio log(Eq/A) and a vector of control variables. Exceptions is the number of times the
bank had losses that exceeded their self-reported Value-at-Risk during the next quarter, log(Eq/A) is the log
of the book equity-to-assets ratio, VE 2006 is the ratio percentage of Value-at-Risk to Equity ( V aREquity ∗100) at
the beginning of 2006, High(VE 2006) is an indicator equal to 1 for observations where VE 2006 is above the
sample median, log(Assets) is the log of total assets, NI-to-Assets is the ratio of quarterly net income-to-assets,
and Vol variables are the volatilities of commodity, S&P 500, Foreign Exchange, and Interest Rate indices.
With VE 2006 measured as of 2006, all observations prior to 2006 are dropped from this subsample. All
continuous variables and Exceptions are standardized (denoted by “(z)”) to have a mean of zero and unit
variance. Standard errors are clustered by year-quarter.
(z)Exceptions
(1) (2) (3)
(z)log(Eq/A) -0.82∗∗ -0.45 0.13
(0.01) (0.15) (0.63)
(z)VE 2006 * (z)log(Eq/A) -0.46∗∗
(0.01)
High(VE 2006) * (z)log(Eq/A) -1.63∗∗∗
(<0.01)
(z)log(Total Assets) 0.41 0.01 0.08
(0.34) (0.97) (0.83)
(z)NI-to-Assets -0.06 -0.00 -0.02
(0.56) (0.95) (0.80)
(z)Vol-Commodities 0.05 0.06 0.04
(0.63) (0.54) (0.68)
(z)Vol-S&P 500 0.36∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.38∗∗
(0.05) (0.03) (0.02)
(z)Vol-Foreign Exchange 0.08 0.07 0.07
(0.47) (0.50) (0.49)
(z)Vol-Interest Rate 0.03 0.09 0.08
(0.87) (0.63) (0.70)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 389 389 389
R2 0.46 0.49 0.49
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6: Equity Ratio, Recent Returns, and Future Value-at-Risk Exceptions
This table presents OLS estimates from a regression of the number of VaR exceptions in the next quarter on
banks’ equity capital ratio log(Eq/A) and a vector of control variables. Exceptions is the number of times the
bank had losses that exceeded their self-reported Value-at-Risk during the next quarter, log(Eq/A) is the log
of the book equity-to-assets ratio, LowRet is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the prior quarter’s return is
less than -5%, log(Assets) is the log of total assets, NI-to-Assets is the ratio of quarterly net income-to-assets,
and Vol variables are the volatilities of commodity, S&P 500, Foreign Exchange, and Interest Rate indices.
All continuous variables and Exceptions are standardized (denoted by “(z)”) to have a mean of zero and unit
variance. Standard errors are clustered by year-quarter.
(z)Exceptions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(z)log(Eq/A) -0.63∗∗∗ -0.61∗∗∗ -0.40∗∗
(<0.01) (<0.01) (0.02)
LowRet 0.19 0.16 0.15
(0.17) (0.23) (0.21)
(z)log(Eq/A) * LowRet -0.37∗∗
(0.03)
(z)log(Total Assets) 0.54 0.73∗ 0.53 0.66∗∗
(0.12) (0.06) (0.13) (0.04)
(z)NI-to-Assets -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01
(0.65) (0.67) (0.70) (0.83)
(z)Vol-Commodities 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.06
(0.57) (0.63) (0.55) (0.45)
(z)Vol-S&P 500 0.35∗∗ 0.31∗ 0.32∗ 0.31∗∗
(0.03) (0.08) (0.06) (0.04)
(z)Vol-Foreign Exchange 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
(0.40) (0.43) (0.38) (0.37)
(z)Vol-Interest Rate 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02
(0.88) (0.82) (0.88) (0.92)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 497 497 497 497
R2 0.46 0.44 0.46 0.48
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 7: Equity Ratio and Future Value-at-Risk Exceptions during Stress
This table presents OLS estimates from a regression of the number of VaR exceptions in the next quarter
on banks’ equity capital ratio log(Eq/A) and a vector of control variables. Exceptions is the number of
times the bank had losses that exceeded their self-reported Value-at-Risk during the next quarter, log(Eq/A)
is the log of the book equity-to-assets ratio, 2008q4 is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the quarter
following Lehman Brothers’ collapse, HiMES is an indicator variable equal to 1 for quarter when the Marginal
Expected Shortfall of the financial sector is in the top quartile for the sample, log(Assets) is the log of total
assets, NI-to-Assets is the ratio of quarterly net income-to-assets, and Vol variables are the volatilities of
commodity, S&P 500, Foreign Exchange, and Interest Rate indices. All continuous variables and Exceptions
are standardized (denoted by “(z)”) to have a mean of zero and unit variance. Standard errors are clustered
by year-quarter.
(z)Exceptions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(z)log(Eq/A) -0.63∗∗∗ -0.53∗∗∗ -0.62∗∗∗ -0.28∗
(<0.01) (0.01) (<0.01) (0.09)
(z)log(Eq/A) * 2008q4 -1.81∗∗∗
(<0.01)
HiMES (top 4-tile) 0.09 0.10
(0.78) (0.74)
(z)log(Eq/A) * HiMES -0.38∗∗
(0.04)
(z)log(Total Assets) 0.54 0.60∗ 0.54 0.62∗∗
(0.12) (0.08) (0.12) (0.05)
(z)NI-to-Assets -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02
(0.65) (0.49) (0.65) (0.75)
(z)Vol-Commodities 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07
(0.57) (0.58) (0.55) (0.44)
(z)Vol-S&P 500 0.35∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.33∗ 0.30∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.09)
(z)Vol-Foreign Exchange 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06
(0.40) (0.40) (0.42) (0.46)
(z)Vol-Interest Rate 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03
(0.88) (0.85) (0.84) (0.87)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 497 497 497 497
R2 0.46 0.54 0.46 0.48
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 8: Explaining the Level of Reported VaR
This table presents OLS estimates from a regression of log(Value-at-Risk) on banks’ equity capital ratio
log(Eq/A), past stock market volatility, and a vector of control variables. log(Eq/A) is the log of the book
equity-to-assets ratio, L.log(1yr S&P vol) is the log of the annualized volatility of daily S&P500 returns over
the past year (similarly defined for lagged two year volatility), log(Assets) is the log of total assets, and
NI-to-Assets is the ratio of quarterly net income-to-assets. All continuous variables are standardized (denoted
by “(z)”) to have a mean of zero and unit variance. Standard errors are clustered by year-quarter.
log(Value-at-Risk)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L.log(1yr S&P vol) 0.12∗∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.04∗
(<0.01) (0.09) (0.06)
(z)log(Eq/A) -0.23∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01)
(z)log(Total Assets) 0.44∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01)
(z)NI-to-Assets -0.10∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01)
(z)log(Eq/A) × L.log(1yr S&P vol) 0.02∗
(0.08)
L.log(2yr S&P vol) 0.07∗∗ 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.67) (0.52)
(z)log(Eq/A) × L.log(2yr S&P vol) 0.03∗∗
(0.04)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 452 452 452 452 452 452
R2 0.85 0.88 0.88 0.84 0.88 0.88
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 9: Stale Model – Omitting Periods and Arellano-Bond Estimates
This table presents OLS estimates from a regression of the number of VaR exceptions in the next quarter on
banks’ equity capital ratio log(Eq/A) and a vector of control variables. Column (1) is the baseline specification
for comparison. Column (2) presents estimates omitting observations in 2007. Columns (3) and (4) present
estimates of estimates of panel regressions using the Arellano and Bond (1991) approach with one and two
lags, respectively. Exceptions is the number of times the bank had losses that exceeded their self-reported
Value-at-Risk during the next quarter, log(Eq/A) is the log of the book equity-to-assets ratio, log(Assets) is
the log of total assets, NI-to-Assets is the ratio of quarterly net income-to-assets, and Vol variables are the
volatilities of commodity, S&P 500, Foreign Exchange, and Interest Rate indices. All continuous variables
and Exceptions are standardized (denoted by “(z)”) to have a mean of zero and unit variance. Standard
errors are clustered by year-quarter.
(z)Exceptions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Drop 2007 AB1lag AB2lags
(z)log(Eq/A) -0.63∗∗∗ -0.60∗∗ -0.46∗∗ -0.46∗∗
(<0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)
L.(z)Exceptions 0.32∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
(<0.01) (<0.01)
L2.(z)Exceptions 0.01
(0.95)
(z)log(Total Assets) 0.54 0.36 0.66∗∗ 0.68∗∗
(0.12) (0.11) (0.02) (0.02)
(z)NI-to-Assets -0.03 -0.05 0.07∗∗ 0.07∗∗
(0.65) (0.47) (0.02) (0.02)
(z)Vol-Commodities 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.06
(0.57) (0.44) (0.11) (0.38)
(z)Vol-S&P 500 0.35∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.05) (<0.01) (<0.01)
(z)Vol-Foreign Exchange 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.03
(0.40) (0.40) (0.38) (0.48)
(z)Vol-Interest Rate 0.03 -0.09 0.16∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
(0.88) (0.34) (<0.01) (<0.01)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 497 448 461 445
R2 0.46 0.45
2nd Order AR Test 0.98 0.94
Sargan Test 0.54 0.51
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 10: Robustness Tests
This table presents OLS estimates from a regression of the number of VaR exceptions in the next quarter
on banks’ equity capital ratio and a vector of control variables. Columns (1)-(4) present OLS estimates of
the base specification along with various control variables. Column (5) presents estimates from a poisson
regression. Column (6) OLS regression estimates of a measure of excess future VaR exceptions in the next
quarter on banks’ equity capital ratio and a vector of control variables. Excess is an indicator variable equal
to 1 when a bank’s number of exceptions exceeds their expected number of exceptions based on the confidence
level (i.e., Exceptions ≥ 0.6 for 99% CI and Exceptions ≥ 3.0 for 95% CI). Exceptions is the number of times
the bank had losses that exceeded their self-reported Value-at-Risk during the next quarter, log(Tier 1 Ratio)
is the log of the Tier 1 capital ratio, log(Eq/A) is the log of the book equity-to-assets ratio, Market Beta
is the bank’s regression market beta estimated using the banks’ prior two years’ stock returns against the
CRSP value-weighted market portfolio, Market Beta is the bank’s regression MBS beta estimated using the
banks’ prior two years’ stock returns against the PIMCO mortgage-backed securities index, log(Assets) is
the log of total assets, NI-to-Assets is the ratio of quarterly net income-to-assets, and Vol variables are the
volatilities of commodity, S&P 500, Foreign Exchange, and Interest Rate indices. Conf95 is an indicator
variable equal to one if the VaR confidence level is at the 95% level, and zero if it is at the 99% level. All
continuous variables and Exceptions are standardized (denoted by “(z)”) to have a mean of zero and unit
variance. Standard errors are clustered by year-quarter.
(z)Exceptions Expanded
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Tier 1 Betas VaR Mix Drop 2008q4 Poisson 1(Exception) Excess
(z)log(Eq/A) -0.56∗∗∗ -0.64∗∗∗ -0.53∗∗∗ -1.18∗∗∗ -0.34∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗
(<0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.03)
(z)log(Tier 1 Ratio) -0.22∗
(0.05)
(z)Market Beta -0.11
(0.36)
(z)MBS Beta 0.03
(0.73)
d Conf95 0.42∗∗ 0.01
(0.02) (0.93)
(z)log(Total Assets) 0.71∗ 0.55 0.53 0.59∗ -0.67 -0.04 -0.08
(0.06) (0.11) (0.12) (0.09) (0.21) (0.85) (0.68)
(z)NI-to-Assets -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.02
(0.58) (0.51) (0.58) (0.54) (0.59) (0.85) (0.66)
(z)Vol-Commodities 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.08 -0.03 0.06 0.04
(0.68) (0.59) (0.55) (0.34) (0.84) (0.44) (0.49)
(z)Vol-S&P 500 0.33∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01)
(z)Vol-Foreign Exchange 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.08 -0.03 -0.04
(0.53) (0.40) (0.38) (0.96) (0.62) (0.54) (0.47)
(z)Vol-Interest Rate 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.14 -0.03 -0.05
(0.68) (0.86) (0.89) (0.94) (0.37) (0.79) (0.67)
VaR Mix No No Yes No No No No
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 497 497 491 485 460 638 638
R2 0.44 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.44 0.45
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
54
A Appendix: Sample Construction
Our sample covers some of the largest commercial banks from U.S., Canada, and Europe
who provide sufficient data on VaR exceptions in their quarterly and annual filings. Because
most trading book activity is concentrated among the largest banks, this is a natural starting
point for our sample construction. It is also worth emphasizing that even though the number
of banks covered in our sample is relatively small, these are the banks that cover most of the
trading businesses in the market. To create a list of all top global banks, we first pulled top
50 banks as of year 2008 from Bankers Almanac maintained at the website www.accuity.com.
This list contains banks from around the world. From this list we narrow our sample to the
subset of North American (Canadian and U.S.) and European Banks. We exclude other
regions for both data availability issues (Asian banks typically do not provide information on
exceptions) and relatively large differences in the timing of the adoption of various provisions
of Basel Recommendations in these countries. After this step, we are left with a list of 29
banks in the sample. We supplement this sample with the sample of all banks that are in top
20 banks in the list of U.S. banks. Together, the union of these lists yield 41 banks for which
we search the quarterly and annual filings
Data on value-at-risk and exceptions are not available in existing publicly available
datasets. We hand-collect these key data items for our analysis directly from banks’ financial
statements. Specifically, we collect the data from the banks’ commentary on their market risk
as discussed in the form 10-Q and 10-K for US banks or form 20-F for foreign banks. We go
through the annual and quarterly reports of each of the remaining banks and include them
in the sample if they report data on VaR exceptions in their quarterly filings. Since some
banks only report annual exceptions, we miss them from our sample because our regressions
are conducted at a quarterly basis. However, the large majority of banks that do not enter
our sample are the ones that do not report this statistics. For example, RBS only mentions
the color zone (e.g, green or yellow) that it belongs to without providing any data on the
number of exceptions. In Table A.1 we provide the names of banks that enter our sample as
well as non-sample banks.
In their discussions of market risk, banks discuss their risk modeling practices and then
provide a table with the level of VaR for the quarter, and also the components that make
up that total. For example, the report includes the break-down of total VaR of the bank
across foreign-exchange VaR, interest-rate VaR, equities VaR, commodities VaR, and the
other category. The table also gives information on diversification factor which accounts for
the imperfect correlation between these asset classes. Table IA.6 in the Internet Appendix
provides an example from Credit Suisse in 2007q1. Along with the table, we provide the text
that accompanies that disclosure in the financial statement.
In addition to the level and composition of VaR, banks also provide the number of
exceptions for the quarter. In some case, especially, for the last quarter of the year, some
banks provide the annual number of exceptions. In such cases we back out the quarterly
exceptions for the last quarter by subtracting from the annual exception the summed values
of the first three quarters of the year. Not all banks report these statistics for the entire
sample period. Though they are required to report these figures to regulators, they are not
55
required to report them in their public financial statements. However, as is typical with
several disclosure practices, most banks continue to disclosure information on exceptions once
they initiate it. A natural question arises: how different are our sample banks from the rest?
We provide a comparison of the banks that are and are not included in our sample and show
that those that disclose are not significantly different from those that do not in Table A.1A.
As we can see from the Table, the two samples are equally matched on asset size and
equity capital ratio. In the figure in Table A.1B we graphically show that they are similar
of these dimensions. The most reliable difference between the two group is the amount of
trading business they have. Our sample covers banks that engage in relatively higher trading
activity. We think this is an advantage of our sample; we are making inference based on a
subset that has meaningful trading business.
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Table A.1: Sample Comparability
Panel A presents a comparison of the size of banks in 2008 that are in the sample with banks that are not in
the sample. The table also shows the mean equity-to-assets ratio for each group of banks (not individually
listed in the table). Panel B presents kernel densities of the size and capitalization data for each group. The
banks chosen for comparison are based on a sample of the largest 50 banks in the world, and then further
restricted to those based in North America or Europe.
Panel A: Raw Statistics
In Sample Not In Sample
Bank Assets ($Bn) Bank Assets ($Bn)
Deutsche Bank 3107.31 Royal Bank of Scotland 3462.97
JPMorgan Chase 2175.05 Barclays 2960.21
Citi Group 1938.47 BNP Paribas 2928.31
UBS 1909.51 HSBC 2527.47
ING Group 1878.79 Credit Agricole 2516.97
Bank of America Corporation 1817.94 BPCE, France 1613.60
UniCredit Group 1475.21 Societe Generale 1594.28
Credit Suisse Group 1109.18 Banco Santander 1480.88
Goldman Sachs 884.55 Wells Fargo 1309.64
Royal Bank of Canada 696.96 Intesa Sanpaolo 897.49
Morgan Stanley 658.81 Commerzbank 882.10
Scotia Bank 488.76 Rabobank 863.62
Toronto Dominion Bank 462.98 Natixis 784.10
Bank of Montreal 341.99 BBVA 761.68
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 290.93 Nordea Bank 668.85
Bank of New York Mellon 195.16 Lloyds Banking Group 628.72
SunTrust Bank 185.10 Standard Chartered 435.07
PNC 140.78 Westpac Banking Corporation 357.53
Itau Unibanco 273.36
Ally Financial 189.48
American Express 126.07
Capital One 115.14
Fifth Third Bank 69.46
Mean Size (listed above) 1097.64 1193.35
Mean Equity-to-Assets (not listed above) 5.01% 5.02%
Panel B: Kernel Densities
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B Appendix: Regulatory Response to VaR Exceptions
VaR Exceptions (Past Year)
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Figure B.1: The Shape of Penalties
This figure presents the shape of regulatory capital multiplier k as a function of past exceptions
(based on trailing 250 trading days).
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Table B.1: VaR Exceptions and the Regulatory Multiplier
This table is reproduced from BIS (1996) and presents the Green, Yellow, and Red zones that supervisors use
to assess VaR model backtesting results. This provides the relationship between VaR exceptions and the
regulatory multiplier k that is used for the market-risk capital charge. The number of exceptions is based on
results from the last 250 trading days (one year).
Zone Number of Exceptions Regulatory Multiplier
Green Zone
0 3.00
1 3.00
2 3.00
3 3.00
4 3.00
Yellow Zone
5 3.40
6 3.50
7 3.65
8 3.75
9 3.85
Red Zone 10 or more 4.00
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Table B.2: Comparability Around the Green-Yellow Threshold
This table presents sample means for observations in the neighborhood of the Green-Yellow threshold in the
regulatory multiplier function. This includes bank-quarter observations where the trailing three quarters’
exceptions are in the range [2-7], where observations with 2-3 exceptions (N=46) are in the Green group,
and observations with 4-8 exceptions (N=21) are in the Yellow Group. The last two columns present the
difference in the two means, and the p-value of that difference.
Variable Green Yellow Difference p-value
Total-Assets-(Bn) 1016.07 927.42 -88.66 (0.68)
Net-Income-(MM) 974.88 1116.34 141.46 (0.67)
NI-to-Assets-(%,Q) 0.14 0.15 0.01 (0.74)
BookEq/AT 5.58 5.83 0.25 (0.74)
Exceptions 0.50 2.48 1.98∗∗∗ (<0.01)
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This appendix presents additional robustness tests, an example of our data collection
method, and additional details on the economic significance of the under-reporting of trading-
book risk.
IA.1 Additional Robustness Tests
IA.1.1 Alternate Parameterizations of Equity Capital
In Table IA.1, we estimate the model with various other measures of equity capital ratio.
We find a coefficient of -0.22 (p-value=0.07) for the model that uses equity-to-assets (Eq/A)
as the key explanatory variable. We find stronger results when the parameterization captures
the nonlinearity of the relationship between equity and incentives, with the effect being
greatest at the lower levels of equity capital as is emphasized in our baseline specification
using the log(Eq/A). For example, we estimate a specification with Eq/A and its square and
find strong results. Building on this idea, we also find a large coefficient for the model that
uses square root of Eq/A (-0.40 with p-value=0.01) and an even larger coefficient for the
model that uses cubic root of Eq/A as the explanatory variable (-0.47 with p-value=0.01).
Overall, these results paint a clear picture. Banks with lower equity capital are more likely
to under-report their risks, and the under-reporting mainly comes when banks have very low
equity capital.
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IA.1.2 Risk Management Expertise
Were violations happening simply because some banks were unprepared for it? We now
provide a more direct test to rule out this alternative. While it is hard, if not impossible,
to directly measure how prepared the banks were for the crisis, we can obtain some useful
information on indicators of preparedness such as the importance of risk-management function
within the bank, or the importance of the Chief Risk Officer (CRO) within the organization.
Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) construct such a measure of risk-management preparedness, called
the risk-management index (RMI), using variables such as the presence of CRO, whether
the CRO is an executive officer of the bank, the ratio of CRO’s compensation to the CEO’s
compensation, board’s risk-management expertise, and the frequency with which the risk-
committee of the bank meets. The RMI is computed using the first principal component of
these variables, and in essence it captures the risk-management preparedness of the bank.
We obtain the value of this index from Ellul and Yerramilli’s database for the sample of our
banks as of 2006.1 We choose 2006 as the year to measure this variable to directly address the
concern that our results are driven by banks that were relatively more unprepared just before
the crisis. With this data, we estimate our baseline regression model without the inclusion of
bank fixed effects (since RMI is a bank-specific constant number). As shown in Appendix
Table IA.2, our main results remain practically unchanged to the inclusion of this variable.
IA.1.3 Penalty Function Placebo Tests
Our analysis on the Green-Yellow discontinuity is based on a threshold of four trailing
exceptions over the prior three quarters. As a placebo test, we artificially move the threshold
to other points on the “trailing-exceptions” axis, and report the results in Table IA.3. For
each placebo, we report both the full sample test, and the tests which restrict the window from
2-7 trailing exceptions. Specifically, we move the threshold to 3 (columns 1-2), 5 (columns
1We thank Andrew Ellul and Vijay Yerramilli for graciously sharing their data with us.
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5-6), and 6 (columns 7-8) trailing exceptions and repeat our analysis. These results can be
compared to those from our main tests with the threshold at 4 trailing exceptions, which
we reproduce in columns 3-4. We do not find positive and significant coefficients on the
interaction of log(Eq/A) × Yellow for the placebo thresholds. Thus our main results are
not simply driven by differences in behavior across bank-quarter observations with higher
versus lower trailing exceptions. Instead, the results are driven by changes in under-reporting
incentives at a specific threshold where the marginal cost of under-reporting changes in a
discontinuous fashion. The result provides further confidence in our identification strategy.
IA.1.4 Additional Measures of Financial System Stress
In the main tests examining under-reporting during times of systemic stress, we measure
financial system stress as (1) the quarter of the Lehman Brothers collapse and (2) an indicator
for time periods in the top sample quartile of marginal expected shortfall (MES). Table
IA.4 presents results of robustness tests where we use a continuous measure of MES, and
also examine three additional financial stress indexes which are constructed by the Federal
Reserve Banks of Cleveland, Kansas City, and St. Louis, respectively. We find similar results.
IA.1.5 Excluding the Crisis Period
It is clear that much of our effects come from the financial crisis period. As a robustness
exercise, we exclude the entire crisis period, starting from 2007Q3 and ending in 2009Q4, from
our sample, and re-estimate our model only with the non-crisis data. Table IA.5 presents the
results. We find a negative and significant coefficient on equity capital when we estimate the
model without the inclusion of bank or year-quarter fixed effects. The coefficient remains
negative but indistinguishable from zero when we include the fixed effects. These results
show that our main findings come from the crisis period, however the broad pattern remains
qualitatively similar outside of this period.
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IA.2 Data Example: Credit Suisse 2007q1
The following is from the Credit Suisse 2007q1 financial review. From this report, we
collect data on the number of VaR exceptions for the quarter (two here), and the average
total VaR for the quarter along with its components. Table IA.6 reproduces a tabulation of
the VaR data from the report.
We assume market risk primarily through the trading activities in Investment
Banking. The other divisions also engage in some trading activities, but to a
much lesser extent.
Trading risks are measured using VaR as one of a range of risk measurement tools.
VaR is the potential loss in fair value of trading positions due to adverse market
movements over a defined time horizon and for a specified confidence level. In
order to show the aggregate market risk in our trading books, the table above
shows the trading-related market risk on a consolidated basis, as measured by a
10-day VaR scaled to a one-day holding period and based on a 99% confidence
level. This means there is a 1-in-100 chance of incurring a daily mark-to-market
trading loss that is at least as large as the reported VaR.
Credit Suisses average one-day, 99% VaR in 1Q07 was CHF 78 million compared
to CHF 70 million during 4Q06 and CHF 71 million during 1Q06. The increase
was mainly due to the introduction of a new methodology to better capture
certain equity risks, as explained below.
Various techniques are used to assess the accuracy of the VaR model, including
backtesting. Daily backtesting profit and loss is compared with VaR calculated
using a one-day holding period. Backtesting profit and loss is a subset of actual
trading revenue and includes only the profit and loss effects from movements
in financial market variables such as interest rates, equity prices and foreign
exchange rates on the previous nights positions. A backtesting exception occurs
when the daily loss exceeds the daily VaR estimate.
We had two backtesting exceptions during the first quarter of 2007 due to market
stress events in late February and early March. During this period, market
volatility was larger than the volatility reflected in the VaR model.
We regularly review our VaR model to ensure that it remains appropriate given
evolving market conditions and the composition of our trading portfolio. Towards
the end of 1Q07, we introduced an enhanced approach for modeling certain equity
risks. If this methodology had been in place as of the end of 4Q06, the period-end
Total VaR would have been CHF 105 million rather than CHF 89 million and
the equity VaR would have been CHF 77 million rather than CHF 57 million. In
addition, we are now extending the length of the historical data set used in the
VaR model beyond two years so that it captures more historical events. Given
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current positions and market conditions, these changes will tend to make the VaR
model more conservative.
IA.3 More details on Economic Significance
IA.3.1 The Scale of Trading Book Capital Charges
To illustrate the scale and variation of the trading book capital charge, we collect more
detailed data on the banks that are in our sample for 2008 and examine the size of their
capital charges as compared to other relevant quantities that reflect costs of a larger capital
charge. We present these data and the resulting calculation in Table IA.7. We use our data
on the maximum 1-day VaR to compute a 10-day VaR (which is the amount used in the
regulatory calculations), then multiply that by the capital multiplier implied by the Basel
regulations (see Table B.1 in the main text for details) to arrive at the trading book capital
charge. We then collect data on each bank’s tier-1 capital, net income, and cash dividends.
Finally, we compute the size trading book capital scaled by each of these quantities to get a
sense of the costliness of the charge.
As discussed in the main text of the paper, the trading book capital charges are not
insignificant compared to the total capital base of the banks, ranging from 0.9% (PNC) to
13.3% (Credit Suisse). When examining the banks’ “marginal” capital base, such as the
relevant addition to (or depletion from) the common equity capital of the bank during the
year, we find that the size of the trading book capital charges are significant when related to
net income and dividends.
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IA.3.2 Sample Calculation of Under-reporting Benefits
In the main text of the paper, we state that under reasonable assumptions, the estimate
from our base regression model (column 5 of Table 3) translates into a VaR under-reporting
of approximately 20% by a bank that has one standard deviation lower equity capital than a
truthful reporter. We arrive at that figure as follows.
Our regression estimates are based on the level of VaR exceptions. In order to compute
the economic importance of VaR under-reporting, we need to invert the number of exceptions
back to the extent of under-reporting. Without the knowledge of the risk-model of the
bank, this is an impossible task. However, we can provide some rough estimates based on
simplifying assumptions. We do so in this section by assuming a very simple VaR model –
one based on normally distributed asset returns. For such a model, the 99% VaR is simply
given by: VaR99% = 2.33 × σ, where σ is the standard deviation of the portfolio. In this
model, under-reporting translates into assuming a lower than true σ by the bank. Let’s
assume that banks under-report their risk by a percentage ur. Then the reported VaR equals
2.33×σ× (1−ur). Let X˜ be the return on this portfolio on a given day. Thus the probability
of exception with under-reporting on a given day is given by the following:
Pr{X˜ < −2.33× σ × (1− ur)}
Let Z be a standard normal random variable. Then, with X˜ as normally distributed with
mean zero and standard deviation of σ, we can easily compute this probability as follows:
Pr{X˜
σ
< −2.33× (1− ur)} =⇒ Pr{Z < −2.33× (1− ur)}
We solve this equation for ur such that the probability of exception matches with our
empirical estimates. Recall, we find that one standard deviation decrease in equity capital
results in an increase of 1.28 exceptions per quarter. Assume 63 trading days in the quarter,
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which gives 0.63 exceptions per quarter for truthful reporter. Thus, we have 1.28+0.63=1.91
exceptions for banks that have one standard deviation lower equity capital than a truthful
reporter. Assuming independence across days in the quarter, this translates into a probability
of 1.91/63=0.0303. Put differently, our estimates suggest 3.03% exceptions compared to 1%
that is expected for a 99% VaR model. Thus we need to solve for ur such that the following
holds:
Pr{Z < −2.33× (1− ur)} = 0.0303 (5)
Using standard normal table, we find that: −2.33× (1− ur) = −1.88, which in turn gives
ur = 19.3%. Thus our regression estimates translates into an under-reporting of 19.3% under
these assumptions.
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Table IA.1: Alternative Parameterizations of Equity Capital
This table presents OLS estimates from a regression of the number of VaR exceptions in the next quarter
on various parameterizations of banks’ equity capital ratio and a vector of control variables. Exceptions is
the number of times the bank had losses that exceeded their self-reported Value-at-Risk during the next
quarter, and (Eq/A) is the book equity-to-assets ratio. Bank Controls include the ratio of quarterly net
income-to-assets and the log of total assets. Volatility Controls include the volatilities of commodity, S&P
500, Foreign Exchange, and Interest Rate indices. All continuous variables and Exceptions are standardized
(denoted by “(z)”) to have a mean of zero and unit variance. Standard errors are clustered by year-quarter.
(z)Exceptions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(z)log(Eq/A) -0.63∗∗∗
(<0.01)
(z)(Eq/A) -0.22∗ -1.52∗∗
(0.07) (0.02)
(z)(Eq/A)2 1.09∗∗
(0.04)
(z)sqrt(Eq/A) -0.40∗∗∗
(0.01)
(z)cube root(Eq/A) -0.47∗∗∗
(0.01)
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Volatility Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 497 497 497 497 497
R2 0.46 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.45
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table IA.2: Controlling for Risk Management
This table presents OLS estimates from a regression of the number of VaR exceptions in the next quarter on
banks’ equity capital ratio log(Eq/A) and a vector of control variables. Exceptions is the number of times the
bank had losses that exceeded their self-reported Value-at-Risk during the next quarter, log(Eq/A) is the
log of the book equity-to-assets ratio, RMI 2006 is the risk-management index, which is a measure of the
importance of risk-management function within the bank, or the importance of the Chief Risk Officer (CRO)
within the organization. Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) construct this measure of risk-management preparedness
using variables such as the presence of a CRO, whether the CRO is an executive officer of the bank, the ratio
of CRO’s compensation to the CEO’s compensation, board’s risk-management expertise, and the frequency
with which the risk-committee of the bank meets. The RMI is computed using the first principal component
of these variables. Bank Controls include the ratio of quarterly net income-to-assets and the log of total
assets. Volatility Controls include the volatilities of commodity, S&P 500, Foreign Exchange, and Interest
Rate indices. All continuous variables and Exceptions are standardized (denoted by “(z)”) to have a mean of
zero and unit variance. Standard errors are clustered by year-quarter.
(z)Exceptions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(z)log(Eq/A) -0.30∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗ -0.18∗∗ -0.21∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
RMI 2006 -0.49∗∗ -0.35∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Bank Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Volatility Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 497 497 431 497 497 431
R2 0.09 0.35 0.38 0.31 0.38 0.41
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table IA.3: Shape of Penalties – Placebo Tests
This table presents OLS estimates from a regression of the number of VaR exceptions in the next quarter on
banks’ equity capital ratio log(Eq/A) and a vector of control variables. Exceptions is the number of times the
bank had losses that exceeded their self-reported Value-at-Risk during the next quarter, log(Eq/A) is the log
of the book equity-to-assets ratio, Bank Controls include the ratio of quarterly net income-to-assets and the
log of total assets. Volatility Controls include the volatilities of commodity, S&P 500, Foreign Exchange, and
Interest Rate indices. Red is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the bank has ten or more VaR exceptions
in the past 3 quarters. For the base specification (columns 3-4), Yellow is an indicator variable equal to 1
when the bank has four to nine VaR exceptions in the past 3 quarters, with those having fewer than that
many exceptions classified as the Green (omitted) group. Columns (1-2) provide estimates of placebo tests
where the Green/Yellow threshold is (incorrectly) placed at three VaR exceptions in the past 3 quarters
(rather than four), with column (1) representing the test using the full sample, and column (2) constraining
the test to the sample nearest to the threshold (See Table 4 for details on the main test). Columns (3-4)
reproduce the base results using the correct threshold of four, and columns (5-6) and columns (7-8) estimate
placebo tests with the threshold at five and six trailing exceptions, respectively. All continuous variables and
Exceptions are standardized (denoted by “(z)”) to have a mean of zero and unit variance. Standard errors
are clustered by year-quarter.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Placebo True Threshold Placebo Placebo
Green/Yellow Threshold 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6
(z)log(Eq/A) -0.40∗ -1.59 -0.34∗ -1.94∗ -0.44∗ -1.75 -0.44∗ -1.50
(0.08) (0.34) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.35) (0.10) (0.33)
Yellow -0.03 -0.61 0.51∗ 1.06 0.29 -0.89 0.47 -1.78
(0.82) (0.20) (0.06) (0.36) (0.39) (0.28) (0.10) (0.41)
(z)log(Eq/A) * Yellow -0.48 -0.78 -0.81∗ -1.56∗∗ -0.49 0.58 -0.51 1.03
(0.17) (0.23) (0.06) (0.04) (0.24) (0.52) (0.26) (0.39)
Red 0.45 0.61 0.49 0.52
(0.45) (0.31) (0.42) (0.36)
(z)log(Eq/A) * Red -0.39 -0.40 -0.32 -0.33
(0.23) (0.20) (0.34) (0.33)
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Volatility Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 445 67 445 67 445 67 445 67
R2 0.52 0.77 0.54 0.85 0.51 0.76 0.51 0.76
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table IA.4: Alternative Measures of Financial Stress
This table presents OLS estimates from a regression of the number of VaR exceptions in the next quarter on
banks’ equity capital ratio log(Eq/A) and a vector of control variables. Exceptions is the number of times the
bank had losses that exceeded their self-reported Value-at-Risk during the next quarter, log(Eq/A) is the
log of the book equity-to-assets ratio, MES is an the Marginal Expected Shortfall of the financial sector,
Cleveland FSI, Kansas City FSI and St. Louis FSI are financial stress indices (FSI) from the respective
federal reserve banks, Bank Controls include the ratio of quarterly net income-to-assets and the log of total
assets. Volatility Controls include the volatilities of commodity, S&P 500, Foreign Exchange, and Interest
Rate indices. All continuous variables and Exceptions are standardized (denoted by “(z)”) to have a mean of
zero and unit variance. Standard errors are clustered by year-quarter.
(z)Exceptions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(z)log(Eq/A) -0.63∗∗∗ 5.35∗∗∗ -0.28∗ -0.21 -0.27
(<0.01) (<0.01) (0.09) (0.23) (0.19)
log(MES) 1.09
(0.15)
(z)log(Eq/A) × log(MES) -0.43∗∗∗
(<0.01)
Cleveland FSI 0.33∗
(0.07)
(z)log(Eq/A) × Cleveland FSI -0.21∗∗
(0.01)
Kansas City FSI 0.32
(0.44)
(z)log(Eq/A) × Kansas City FSI -0.20∗∗
(0.05)
StLouis FSI 0.80∗∗∗
(<0.01)
(z)log(Eq/A) × StLouis FSI -0.20∗∗
(0.04)
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Volatility Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 497 497 497 497 497
R2 0.46 0.50 0.51 0.53 0.56
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table IA.5: Base Specification Excluding Observations from 2007q3-2009q4
This table presents OLS estimates from a regression of the number of VaR exceptions in the next quarter
on banks’ equity capital ratio log(Eq/A) and a vector of control variables for observations outside the
financial crisis (2007q3-2009q4). Exceptions is the number of times the bank had losses that exceeded their
self-reported Value-at-Risk during the next quarter, 1(Exception) is an indicator variable equal to one if the
bank experienced at least one exception the next quarter, log(Eq/A) is the log of the book equity-to-assets
ratio, log(Assets) is the log of total assets, NI-to-Assets is the ratio of quarterly net income-to-assets, and
Vol variables are the volatilities of commodity, S&P 500, Foreign Exchange, and Interest Rate indices. All
continuous variables and Exceptions are standardized (denoted by “(z)”) to have a mean of zero and unit
variance. Standard errors are clustered by year-quarter.
(z)Exceptions 1(Exception)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(z)log(Eq/A) -0.03∗∗ -0.04∗∗ -0.02 -0.03∗ -0.04∗∗ -0.05
(0.05) (0.04) (0.73) (0.08) (0.02) (0.46)
(z)log(Total Assets) 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗ 0.06 0.03∗∗ 0.03 -0.05
(0.02) (0.06) (0.55) (0.04) (0.17) (0.57)
(z)NI-to-Assets 0.02 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.01 0.05∗∗ 0.05
(0.15) (0.05) (0.06) (0.53) (0.05) (0.14)
(z)Vol-Commodities -0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.68) (0.60) (0.66) (0.58) (0.62) (0.61)
(z)Vol-S&P 500 0.10∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
(0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01)
(z)Vol-Foreign Exchange -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.76) (0.96) (0.92) (0.26) (0.34) (0.45)
(z)Vol-Interest Rate -0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.04
(0.92) (0.41) (0.45) (0.71) (0.54) (0.47)
Bank FE No No Yes No No Yes
Year-Quarter FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 359 359 359 359 359 359
R2 0.11 0.23 0.27 0.08 0.24 0.30
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table IA.6: Credit Suisse 2007q1 Value-at-Risk
This presents an example of the value-at-risk reporting from the Credit Suisse 2007q1 financial
review. As the maximum and minimum occur on different days for different risk types, it is not
meaningful to calculate a maximum or minimum portfolio diversification benefit. All figures are in
CHF millions.
Interest Rate/ Foreign Diversification
Credit Spread Exchange Commodities Equities Benefit Total
Average 53 17 12 64 -68 78
Minimum 46 8 8 51 - 56
Maximum 67 31 20 84 - 96
End of period 55 21 10 77 -67 96
Exceptions - - - - - 2
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Table IA.7: Computation of Trading Book Capital Charge
The table below displays calculations of estimates of the market risk capital charges for banks in our base sample based on their respective reported
Value-at-Risk figures in 2008 (12 banks have available date as of 2008q4).All figures are in millions in the respective banks’ currencies except for the
capital multiplier and ratios presented in the bottom portion of the table. These figures are from annual financial statements and authors’ calculations.
Bank BAC BK BMO BNS CM CS DB JPM PNC RY TD UBS
Currency USD USD CAD CAD CAD CHF EUR USD USD CAD CAD CHF
Trading Book Data
Max 1-day VaR 255.7 18.9 57.9 30.4 21.1 360.0 172.9 420.0 18.4 50.0 104.8 207.0
Max 10-day VaR 808.6 59.8 183.1 96.1 66.7 1138.4 546.8 1328.2 58.2 158.1 331.4 654.6
Capital Multiplier (k) 3.50 3.00 3.75 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 3.50 3.85 3.75 3.00 4.00
Trading Capital Charge 2830.1 179.3 686.6 288.4 200.2 4553.7 2187.0 4648.5 224.0 592.9 994.2 2618.4
Company Financials
Tier-1 Capital 120814 15402 18729 23263 12365 34208 31094 136104 24287 25173 20679 33371
Net Income 4008 1419 1978 3140 -2060 -8218 -3896 5605 882 4555 3813 -21292
Cash Dividend on Common 11528 1107 1410 1896 1404 2821 2274 5633 902 2624 1577 none
Trading Capital Scaled By:
Tier-1 Capital 2.3% 1.2% 3.7% 1.2% 1.6% 13.3% 7.0% 3.4% 0.9% 2.4% 4.8% 7.8%
Net Income 70.6% 12.6% 34.7% 9.2% -9.7% -55.4% -56.1% 82.9% 25.4% 13.0% 26.1% -12.3%
Cash Dividend on Common 24.5% 16.2% 48.7% 15.2% 14.3% 161.4% 96.2% 82.5% 24.8% 22.6% 63.0% N/A
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